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STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

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STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the theory and practice of personnel management in Communist China. It endeavors to draw together information on how Chinese skilled manpower and talent are selected, motivated, advanced and organized in the pursuit of national goals. It begins with a consideration of personnel requirements at the senior levels of the party, surveying the broad functions performed and sketching out the background and character of the incumbents. It then takes a look at the mechanics for staffing various echelons of the party. This is followed by an examination of how the party actually handles its personnel.

These chapters are followed by a discussion, arranged along similar lines, of the requirements for top government executives, the system of government personnel administration and how it operates in practice. A special chapter is devoted to the armed forces.

Later chapters take up in turn the educational system and the means used by the leaders to communicate with lower levels of the administrative apparatus and the Chinese people. The concluding section is a general assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the whole system.

Several characteristics of the Chinese Communists' approach to this problem are, we think, deserving of special mention.

1. A striking feature of the Chinese system, even in comparison with its Soviet counterpart, is the pervasiveness of party control and manipulation. Positions of real authority anywhere in China are without exception held by party members. In fact, no level of government, no military, scientific, economic or educational organization, no activity of any moment is without its party group, the members of which effectively run the unit. Advancement is unlikely if the party does not approve.

2. Stability in the highest reaches of the party has been unusual for a system which in other

places has bred frequent change. Mao Tse-tung has been the dominant figure for nearly three decades. He has kept around him a group of associates he trusts. Today, these men are old and overworked. They present an all but immovable roadblock against aspirants to high office. And it has also proven a difficult matter to insinuate new concepts, especially in technical fields, into the policy making process. The leaders tend to turn for advice to party figures who share the experiences and prejudices of the leaders.

3. Personnel management is highly centralized. The system allows the men who determine national security programs to commit available talent to these programs in complete freedom. There is no outside competition for talent.

4. China is, however, very short of top-flight talent--administrators, managers, scientific researchers, tutors for graduate students, technicians, etc. Still the Chinese leaders misuse what they do have by a dogmatic refusal to trust fully those educated abroad, whether in the USSR or the West, and by forcing everyone to spend much time in political indoctrination.

5. These political indoctrination programs and the absolute control of all media of communication permit the leaders to disseminate only such information as they think fitting. This has contributed to a unity of purpose throughout the system and a willingness to work hard at tasks set by the leaders, though the degree of dedication today is not what it was several years ago.

II. STAFFING THE PARTY

National security policy in Communist China is directed to building China over the shortest historical span possible into a strong, modern leader of nations with all the paraphernalia of power that implies. The goal is a China respected for its military and political power, honored for its culture, turned to for its principled interpretation of Communist doctrine; in short, a China restored to its rightful leading role in the world. The present leaders are dedicated to the proposition that this can only be done through the development of an authoritarian, Communist system of government in China.

The Chinese Communist Party, in power throughout mainland China since 1949, is still in the early phases of a big construction effort. The attempts of the leaders in 1958-1960 to accelerate the process through "leap forward" practices were a dismal failure. The country is groping its way out of the rubble of that disaster. It did not, however, shake the leadership out of the conviction that its cause and course are correct. Nor has it shaken the present leaders from their dominant positions.

Staffing Requirements at Senior Levels

Ultimate power, in the Chinese Communist system, rests in one man, whose qualities determine in great measure how the whole will operate. That man now is Mao Tse-tung, father figure of the Chinese Communist movement. The guiding principles and the programs by which the nation operates are in the final analysis his responsibility. Many issues can, of course, be settled short of Mao, but he is the final arbiter.

During the nearly three decades of Mao's stewardship, the Chinese party has been transformed from a small, hunted band of revolutionaries fleeing to the barren hills of northwestern China into the ruling element of the largest single group of people on the face of the globe. This record of success has made, and continues to make, effective challenge of Mao a very difficult proposition.

To the Chinese party, Mao is the "greatest revolutionary and statesman in Chinese history", and the most prominent communist "among all living contemporaries."

INTERLOCKING POSITIONS OF SELECTED CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS

() 1956 Rank in Central Committee	Party	Government
(1) Mao Tse-tung	Chairman, CCP Central Committee; Chairman, CCP Politburo	Honorary Chairman, CPPCC; Deputy, NPC
(2) Liu Shao-chi	Member, Standing Committee, CCP Politburo	Chairman, People's Republic of China; Chairman, National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC; Member, CPPCC
(4) Teng Hsiao-ping	Member, Standing Committee, CCP Politburo; Ranking Member, CCP Secretariat; Secretary General, Central Committee	Vice Premier, State Council; Vice Chairman, National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC
(6) Chou En-lai	Member, Standing Committee, CCP Politburo	Premier, State Council; Chairman, CPPCC; Deputy, NPC
(7) Tung Pi-wu	Member, CCP Politburo; Secretary, Central Committee Control Commission	Vice Chairman, People's Republic of China; Deputy, NPC
(8) Chen Yun	Member, Standing Committee, CCP Politburo	Vice Premier, State Council; Member, State Planning Commission; Deputy, NPC
(9) Lin Biao	Member, Standing Committee, CCP Politburo; Member, Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee	Vice Premier, State Council; Minister of National Defense; Vice Chairman, National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC
(13) Li Fu-chun	Member, CCP Politburo; Member, CCP Secretariat	Vice Premier, State Council; Chairman, State Planning Commission; Deputy, NPC
(14) Lo Jung-huan	Member, CCP Politburo; Member, Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee	Vice Chairman, National Defense Council; Vice Chairman, NPC
(16) Lu Ting-i	Alternate Member, CCP Politburo; Member, CCP Secretariat; Director, CCP Propaganda Dept.	Vice Premier, State Council; Deputy, NPC
(17) Lo Jui-ching	Member, CCP Central Committee; Member, CCP Secretariat	Vice Premier, State Council; Vice Minister of National Defense; Chief of Staff, PLA; Member, National Defense Council; Vice Chairman, NPC
(21) Chen Yi	Member, CCP Politburo	Vice Premier, State Council; Minister of Foreign Affairs; Director, Foreign Affairs Staff Office, State Council; Vice Chairman, National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC; Vice Chairman, CPPCC
(24) Li Hsien-nien	Member CCP Politburo; Member, CCP Secretariat	Vice Premier, State Council; Director, Staff Office for Finance and Trade, State Council; Minister of Finance; Vice Chairman, State Planning Commission; Member, National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC
(26) Nieh Jung-chen	Member, CCP Central Committee; Member, CCP Secretariat; Member, Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee	Vice Premier, State Council; Chairman Science and Technology Commission, State Council; Vice Chairman, National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC
(29) Peng Chen	Member, CCP Politburo; Member, CCP Secretariat; First Secretary, Peking Municipal CCP Committee	Secretary General, NPC; Vice Chairman, CPPCC; Chairman, Peking Municipal People's Government

Public speeches by Mao's foremost associates bristle with fulsome tributes to Mao's insights, wisdom and knowledge. Practicing experts in virtually any field--ideological, economic, military, literary, scientific--are advised to improve themselves by studying Mao's works. Chinese policies in all these fields are presented as owing much to the master.

Mao Tse-tung, born the son of a rich peasant, has been a member of the Chinese Communist Party since it was formed in 1921, and has been its leader since 1935. He is a man of supreme self-confidence. For years he has shown an ability to adapt Marxist-Leninist formulas to suit his own purposes as well as a certain talent for making the right decision at the right time.

This talent may perhaps be diminishing; at least, his more recent initiatives have not been notably successful. The great leap forward, the commune movement and the challenge to the Soviets have all proved singularly inappropriate to China's needs at this stage of its development.

Mao is widely read in the literature of Marxism-Leninism. He writes well, frequently in a breezy style full of pithy language which appeals to Chinese. He has been able to attract and hold competent subordinates, and has shown an ability to balance them off, one against the other.

He has been outside China only twice, in 1950 and 1957, both times to the Soviet Union. His knowledge and understanding of the outside world are limited. His grasp of internal Chinese conditions may be slipping. Rumors have been trickling out of China for the past several years that Mao's health has been declining. Whatever the state of his powers, Mao's speeches and writings have diminished quite remarkably since about 1957. In recent years, he has spent a good deal of time in various vacation spots away from the levers of power in Peiping.

Standing just behind Mao in the power structure are his six colleagues on the Standing Committee of the Politburo. This inner circle of advisors joins Mao in developing, formulating and coordinating China's domestic, foreign and defense policies.

Considerable figures in their own right, they are widely experienced in party, state and military affairs. They are expected to look at issues which come before them in a comprehensive, overall way. They must watch the whole chessboard, not just one of the pieces. Each of them, however, does appear to have a broad area of specialization. Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping seem to give the greater measure of their attention the theoretical and practical concerns of the party. Chou En-lai's chief concern is the government and its foreign relations. Lin Piao concentrates on military affairs. Chu Teh, generally inactive, sometimes serves as a spokesman for Mao. Chen Yun spends most of his time on economic matters, though he has been out of the public eye for some time now.

These are men with a long history of devotion to the hierarch, men who have thrived on decades of the vicious in-fighting which characterizes the system, men who are tough and ruthless, men who speak a common language and hold common views. They are men who have been conditioned by many years of party work to understand the time for debate and the limits placed thereon. The effective operation of the entire structure requires that the men at this level be tightly knit. They must know how and when to submerge differences and show a common purpose to the other layers of the party and to the people at large.

The continuity of this group is remarkable for a system which in other countries and parties has bred frequent bloody change. Turnover has been limited. The five men who were on the party Secretariat in 1945 are still formally in the inner circle today.

Ranking next to Mao is Liu Shao-chi. To some, he appears a classic example of the faithful servant. They point to his speeches with their many sycophantic passages, and speculate that he will not long outlast Mao. However, Liu does wield great power in the party organization. Mao has complete confidence in Liu's abilities and has made Liu his heir apparent. The party presents him as its leading theoretician, next to Mao. His 1939 work, How to be a Good Communist, was recently re-issued and made the subject of a special party study campaign.

Liu is a somber and a somewhat colorless individual. After he was selected to succeed Mao as head of government in 1959, an attempt was made by the party's propaganda organs to paint a more engaging public picture of him. The campaign seems to have died away with doubtful results.

Liu's closest collaborator in party matters is Teng Hsiao-ping, one of the youngest members of the inner circle. Teng has risen rapidly in favor and prestige since the mid-fifties. In recent years he has been the party's chosen spokesman on a number of key issues, and in 1960 played a large part in the Moscow conference of communist parties.

A short, bullet-headed man, Teng is said to be hard-driving and aggressive. The party obviously regards him as a good organizer and sound administrator. His several strategic positions in the central apparatus give him powerful levers over party matters.

Chou En-lai, the only premier the Chinese Communist government has ever had, is perhaps the best known of the Chinese Communists in the West. Handsome and urbane, Chou for years was the principal face which the Chinese Communists turned to the world. He has travelled more than his colleagues in the inner circle and he may, as a result, have a more sophisticated view of the outer world. He is by all accounts a skilled and resourceful negotiator. He showed at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and in an early visit to India that he is quite expert at building up an aura of Chinese goodwill.

What should not be lost sight of is that Chou is also a veteran communist, a high-ranking member of the party for at least four decades. He was once ranked ahead of Mao and has shown a remarkable agility in getting along with whoever happens to be in power. Chou's wife is the number two woman in the party.

The other active member of the inner circle is Lin Piao. He is the youngest. A military man for his entire career, Lin had apparently been

ailing for a number of years. He leapt back into prominence following the disgrace of Peng Teh-huai in 1959. Lin was one of the most successful generals produced by the Chinese Communists in their fight against the Chinese Nationalists. His return coincided with a renewed emphasis on the supremacy of the party over the military.

The Politburo and Secretariat

Standing just outside this inner circle are the remaining full (voting) members of the Politburo. This body has considerable importance as an advisory board, a discussion group and, sometimes, as a voting body. Decisions taken by the Standing Committee have the full force of a Politburo decision, but Politburo sanction may well be sought for major policy shifts. Meaningful voting in the Politburo is probably restricted to issues on which Mao and his inner circle have not staked out a definite position.

The advice of Politburo members is likely to be sought prior to decision on a matter in which the individual member is expert. All nineteen of the voting members are men with a record of thirty to forty years of faithful service to the party. They represent a variety of backgrounds and are capable of providing advice in many fields. Here appear the top specialists in various aspects of party work: Peng Chen has long been in party organizational work and has represented the party at important communist meetings abroad. Tung Pi-wu is engaged in supervisory work, Tan Chen-lin is concentrating on agricultural matters, Lo Jung-huan is a senior figure in party control work in the armed forces. Chen Yi, Li Fu-chun and Li Hsien-nien are the party's top specialists, respectively, in the government's foreign, economic planning and financial affairs. Ko Ching-shih and Li Ching-chuan are the top leaders in East and Southwest China and may bring regional points of view into the Politburo.

No additions to the Politburo have been announced since 1958. Good bets for election to the next Politburo are Tao Chu and Sung Jen-chiung, heads of the Central-South and Northeast party bureaus, respectively.

Since Mao took over in 1935, only three men of Politburo rank can confidently be said to have been purged; Chang Kuo-tao shortly afterwards, Kao Kang in 1954 and Peng Teh-huai in 1959. Several have been demoted, others have died, but seven members of the present Politburo were on the 11-man body elected in 1945.

The presence of a number of party elders in these key groups should not be misconstrued. Though they are relatively inactive, they do serve a definite purpose by providing automatic support for Mao on any matters put before them.

Another key top level body is the Secretariat, the executive office of the party for day-to-day operations. It is under the direction of the Standing Committee and the Politburo, and differs from these bodies largely in that it is, formally, a full-time body. Although the counsel of its members is probably sought before new policy is finalized, the Secretariat's main task is to monitor the execution of decisions taken by its parent bodies. The Secretariat may well be the party's instrumentality for directing and coordinating the party's central departments.

The ranking official on the Secretariat is Teng Hsiao-ping. His four leading associates are all Politburo figures--Peng Chen, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien and Tan Chen-lin. Also included are Lo Jui-ching, who is Chief of Staff of the armed forces and a long-time security expert; Kang Sheng, an intelligence man; Lu Ning-yi and Hu Chiao-mu, propaganda experts; Li Hsueh-feng, industrial matters; Liu Lan-tao, organizational and control matters within the party; Wang Chia-hsiang, who was once involved in liaison with other parties but has not been active lately; and, Yang Shang-kun, who holds several top administrative positions. Lo Jui-ching, Kang Sheng and Lu Ning-yi were added to the Secretariat by the tenth plenum of the Central Committee in September 1962.

The Second Level

The Central Committee itself, nominally 97 full and 95 alternate members, has functioned under Mao as a rubber stamp body, convened to be instructed

concerning decisions taken by the dominant leaders. By the time it meets the needs of the top command for expert advice have been met and the line in all essentials has been set. It could, as has happened in the Soviet party, emerge as an important deliberative body if an issue arose on which the leaders were critically divided.

An individual's rank within the Central Committee is important as his mark of preferment.

The party's central departments provide the staff to prepare position papers on matters coming before the policy makers and to oversee, under the direction of the Standing Committee and the Secretariat, the party's day-to-day operations. The men who run these departments are in charge of the party's interests in propaganda, police, rural, industrial, finance and trade, communications, united front, and party organization work as well as liaison with foreign parties. They make many of the daily decisions on how party policies are to be executed within their areas of competence. They are in a sense going through the last and highest training course which the party offers its future leaders.


The committees (really sub-committees) under the Central Committee are on the same level as the departments but differ in that they tend to meet irregularly as the occasion or the leaders demand. Like other committees, they probably have permanent standing bodies. Included are the Committee for Organs Directly Subordinate to the Central Committee, the Committee for Central State Organs and the Women's Work Committee.

Two important commissions, the Control Commission and the Military Affairs Commission, also come just under the Central Committee on party organization charts. They are discussed below.

The Next Generation

The top levels of the party are nicely layered according to age and party seniority. Virtually all of the top leaders went through the crucible of the Long March, a 6,000-mile hegira in 1934-1936 which transferred the party's base from Kiangsi to

APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION IN 1956



Shensi Province. The Long Marchers are getting on. Mao is almost 70 and most of his key advisers are over 60. The new generation will probably be dominated by another brand of Communist whose formative years in the party were in the fight against the Japanese.

After they take over, it is possible that many of the old Maoist ways will go. The new group will very likely not have the remarkable measure of cohesiveness of Mao's group. Most of the new men, including its leading figures, will have made their mark in the party apparatus. It is possible, however, that by the time the new group gets entrenched officials who have made their mark in economic, scientific or other specialities will begin to exert greater influence in high policy making levels.

The Party and the State

In Communist China the party's field of direct interest and influence extends into every nook and cranny of the government and military establishment, of every economic or scientific installation, of every education institution. "The party must, and can, lead all--the state organs, the armed forces, the people's bodies," runs a typical instruction to party workers.

Party control is brought to bear by the assignment of trusted party members to positions, usually of authority, in all non-party organizations. Called "leading members' groups", they are assigned by an appropriate party committee. The Central Committee determines the make up of the "leading members' groups" in central government offices; provincial committees do the same for the provincial governments, county committees for the counties. These "leading members' groups" remain under the direction of their assigning committees, not under a "leading members' group" in a superior non-party organization.

The party has a number of full-time workers who perform no job outside the party, but the majority work in government offices, in the military, in economic and cultural establishments, or in people's organizations. They remain under strict party discipline. Failure to detect and

report without delay the slightest shortcoming, from the party's point of view, would open them to serious charges.

The pattern of party influence brought to bear by party members is repeated at the working level. Every basic level installation, be it factory, mine, collective farm, or military unit, has its own party organization appointed by an appropriate party committee. It is the duty of the party organizations to transmit party policy and see to it that the policy is understood and implemented completely. They must adapt the policies, as necessary, to local conditions.

The Structure for Staffing Party Organizations

The Leading Bodies

The 1956 party constitution declares that the National Party Congress is the "highest leading body" of the party. It is elected. But the timing of its election, the number of delegates, and the manner in which they are elected are controlled by the "in" group. The "in's" reserve to themselves the right to run members of superior party organizations "who need to be elected" in local elections. They also can cancel the election of anyone they deem "inadequate." The present Eighth Congress was elected in 1956 for a term of five years. It is still in office. Its opening session was attended by just over 1,000 delegates. The party's first congress, in 1921, was attended by twelve.

A party congress provides a forum for the airing of party policies, but its most important task is to elect a Central Committee to act for it when it is not in session. The importance of this provision derives from the infrequency with which National Party Congresses are convened. The Eighth has met but twice, in 1956 and 1958, despite provisions in the party constitution, which it adopted, that it meet once a year. In fact, during the six and one-half years it has been in office it has met in session for a grand total of 32 days.

The present Central Committee, the eighth, came to office in 1956, the result of a carefully contrived electoral process designed by the party center to bring minimal disturbance to the then existing hierarchical arrangements. It was an "election with leadership." The top leaders decided on the number of candidates who would stand for election, named them and arranged the electoral lists in proper order of precedence.

All of this took a lot of arranging, and may have prompted a leading party figure to warn that "too many elections are unnecessary and may handicap our work." The party has generally followed his advice.

Theoretically at least, ultimate authority for the disposition of important personnel matters rests in the Central Committee. The 1956 party constitution spells this out: the Central Committee, it states, "takes charge of and allocates party cadres." (The term cadre, in Chinese kanpu, is applied by the Chinese Communists to officials and functionaries in both the party and the government and is used in either an individual or a group sense.) When the Central Committee is not in plenary session, its powers and functions, including those involving the disposition of cadres, pass to the Politburo, its Standing Committee and the Secretariat, all elected by the Central Committee. The Eighth Central Committee has met in plenary session ten times for a total of some 75 days since 1956.

In practice, therefore, its authority over cadre regulation is delegated to its continuing bodies. The highest authority in personnel, as in all other matters, doubtless rests with Mao Tse-tung. It is likely that Mao still takes an active interest in assignments to key positions, since any other course could carry grave dangers for him. A number of lesser personnel actions may ultimately be referred to him for decision. There is bound, for example, to be serious competition among various departments of China's national security setup for skilled manpower and managerial talent, which are among the nation's scarcest resources.

He is very likely assisted in his deliberations on these matters by his four active assistants on the Standing Committee with Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping representing the party's interests, Chou En-lai the government's and Lin Piao those of the military establishment. Communist China is not known to have a system, as do the Soviets, which specifies just which non-party jobs require the stamp of approval of what party body. The Chinese system is in general highly centralized, and the Standing Committee may well require that it pass on all recommendations for appointments to key jobs in the party central organs, in the government's top bodies, in economic, cultural and scientific enterprises of national security significance, in the armed forces and in the regions and provinces. The Standing Committee doubtless reserves for itself the right to determine just what constitutes a "key" assignment requiring its O.K.

In acting on proposals for filling "key" jobs, Mao and the Standing Committee rely heavily upon the Secretariat, through which related personnel records and data are channeled. As the directing and coordinating agency for the regular central organizations of the party, the Secretariat can probably approve on its own appointments to a range of positions below those on which the Standing Committee and Mao act. In any case, the principal figure on the Secretariat, Teng Hsiao-ping, is also in Mao's inner circle, a circumstance which doubtless gives him vast authority in the personnel field. He is, at a minimum, the needle's eye through which a man must pass on his way to a position of real authority.

Teng's assistants on the Secretariat oversee the work of one or another of the party's central organs and through them exert considerable influence on central government offices. These assistants are very likely responsible for advising Teng and the Secretariat on those aspects of a candidate's party standing and qualifications which fall within the competence of their particular departments. They can probably act directly on a certain level of position within their own areas. Most of these secretaries have had long experience in party organizational work.

The Central Departments

Neither the Standing Committee, the Politburo nor the Secretariat is sufficiently rich in personnel to discharge in detail the constitutional charge which devolves on them "to take charge of and allocate cadres." The size of this job is suggested by the fact that in 1956, the last year for which figures are at hand, there were over 300,000 party cadres at the county committee level and higher. The 1963 total is surely higher. So, again, much of the function is delegated to bodies which the Central Committee has set up, and staffed, to be its executive agents in its "diverse businesses." Among these are the Organization Department, the Control Commission, the Committee for Party Organs Directly Subordinate to the Central Committee, and the Committee for Central State Organs. Other central departments play lesser roles.

The Organization Department, though no longer the power it once was, still plays a strong hand in the administration of party cadres. Prior to 1954, it controlled most aspects of party personnel management. It had responsibility for recruitment, training, assignment, promotion, transfer of party cadres as well as the maintenance of party personnel records, the collection of party dues and the investigation of party members' reliability. In 1954 the party elders discovered that the then chief of the Organization Department, Jao Shu-shih, had been attempting to use the office to unseat them. He was removed forthwith, and the Organization Department was shorn of many of its powers.

A 1959 study, written by the Research Office of the post-Jao Organization Department for the use of its cadres, explains the role of the Organization Department as that of a "deputy and staff chief" to party committees for cadre administration. The study is studded with warnings that the Organization Department ought not "stick its nose into the proper business of others." It must, rather, keep to its "own share" of the administration of party cadres and party members.

This share is not inconsiderable. The study explains that the Organization Department remains active in the selection, promotion and training of party cadres and in "developing" party members.

It still handles the records of party personnel. It probably still has much to do with the placement of party men in positions which the higher levels, the Secretariat and the Standing Committee, do not keep in their own hands.

The present head of the Organization Department is An Tzu-wen, who was a deputy under Jao but definitely not his accomplice. An was once Minister of Personnel of the Central Government, and played a large part in the big initial effort to staff the new government (1950-1954).

Some of the functions formerly given the Organization Department have probably been entrusted to the Committee for Party Organs Directly Subordinate to the Central Committee. Little has been said about this unit, but its name suggests it was conceived to supervise the party's central organs, keep them informed on policy matters, and, perhaps, to assist in handling their ordinary staffing needs. It is headed by Yang Shang-kun, who is concurrently Director of the Central Committee's General Office and an alternate secretary of the Secretariat. Like An Tzu-wen, Yang is not a party heavyweight. He has seemed, rather, to be a trustworthy administrative functionary who sees to the routine office tasks of the Central Committee, handles correspondence and maintains records.

Other of the old Organization Department's functions probably went to the Committee for Central State Organs, which is believed to regulate the work of party members who have been placed in jobs with the central government. It is not known how big a role this committee plays in the assignment, promotion or transfer of party members in the government. The pattern could possibly be an advisory role for higher positions, a more assertive role for lower ones. The committee is headed by Kung Tzu-jung, who is concurrently an alternate member of the Control Commission, Yang's deputy in the General Office and a Deputy Secretary General of the State Council.

The Control Commission

A principal element of Jao's power in the old Organization Department, that of investigating the loyalty of party members, has passed entirely to the

Control Commission. The 1945 party constitution had provided for the establishment of both central and local control commissions, but prior to 1955 they were never set up. In their stead, a system of discipline inspection teams was established. They were empowered to deal with specific breaches of party discipline only after they had occurred. The inadequacy of these arrangements was clearly exposed by the case of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, two prominent party figures who were expelled from the party in 1954 for trying to split the party and usurp supreme power. The party conference which expelled the pair also decided to establish strong control commissions, at both the central and local levels. The new commissions were given the power to investigate a party member before a breach of discipline took place. They were charged with preventing a recurrence of so serious a case as the "anti-party alliance" of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih. Unlike the earlier discipline inspection teams, the new commissions were specifically empowered by the conference to check up on party organizations, though discipline was to be meted out on an individual basis.

Working under the direction of party committees at the same level, control commissions take disciplinary action against party members and review sentences meted out by lower levels. They do not concern themselves with the minor day-to-day derelictions still handled by the Organization Department. They are interested in major disciplinary problems like anti-Maoist plotting, and are obviously immensely important in the party security setup. Their influence on cadre selection is likely to be large negative. A party member coming under their purview is not a good candidate for further advancement.

The central Control Commission is an elite group. It is set somewhat apart from other of the party's central departments and committees in that its leading personnel are elected. The Commission was "strengthened" by the election of additional, but unnamed, new members at the tenth plenum of the Central Committee, September 1962. It has a priority claim on personnel and its staff apparatus appears to be one of the best developed of any central party organ. It has been headed since

its inception by Tung Pi-wu, the only original founder of the Chinese Communist Party outside of Mao Tse-tung still active. An aged though not inconsiderable figure, Tung is ranked seventh in the Central Committee and is the first Vice Chairman of the Government. Among Tung's principal deputies is Liu Lan-tao, who combines a position on the commission with being a member of the powerful Secretariat. Another is a high ranking officer in the General Political Department of the Army, the office charged with the political indoctrination of the army. A third was until 1960 Minister of Interior (previously Minister of Supervision). The three would seem to be the principal figures in overseeing the conduct of members working respectively, in the party, the military establishment and the government.

Other central organs which play a role in personnel management include the Propaganda Department, which handles the education and indoctrination of party members. This is an immense job on which the Chinese party lavishes time, money and effort. The Propaganda Department is headed by Lu Ting-yi, who is also a member of the Secretariat. The Social Affairs Department plays a shadowy and unexplained role in the never-ending job of policing the party. Li Kung was the head of this organ until his death in 1961. It may have declined in importance since his death.

The Women's Work Committee keeps an eye on the interests of female party members. Roughly 10 percent of party members are women, although the percentage drops sharply as you move up in the hierarchy. There are, for example, only four women on the Central Committee. The ranking female comrade, Tsai Chang (Mrs. Li Fu-chun), is also head of the Women's Work Committee. The committee works to overcome "discrimination" against women cadres and see that they get the same opportunities for advancement as male cadres. "Some organizations," Tsai Chang once complained, "tend to promote more men than women even when choosing between persons of equal competence." The United Front Department takes charge of the party's relations with cooperating organizations and nationalities groups. It probably has some

say in the selection of individuals from such organizations for various posts.

Regional, Provincial and County Posts

The constitution permits the Central Committee of the party, as it deems necessary, to establish bureaus covering several provinces. Such regional bureaus existed between 1949 and 1954. They were abolished after the Kao-Jao incident and were not revived until January 1961, when the need for a more coordinated regional attack on some of the party's problems impressed itself upon the leaders. The parallel government and military bodies which existed in the 1949-1954 period have not reappeared, at least publicly. Today there are six regional bureaus of the Central Committee--the Northeast, North, East, Central-South, Southwest, and Northwest. Peiping has been uncommonly sparing of detail concerning their responsibilities and make-up. The post-1961 versions appear to range across roughly the same spectrum of interests as party committees at other levels. Each of them apparently has the authority to create such subordinate organizations as it feels are needed. Their staffing patterns seem still to be in the developmental stage, though many of them have begun to staff the usual run of subordinate departments for propaganda, rural work, finance and the like. No regional organization departments or control commissions have yet been identified.

The leading personnel of the regional bureaus are selected directly by the party center. The individuals named are probably then allowed to fill out their own staffs. The present regional bosses are senior party officials, drawn some from Peiping and some from the provinces. The Northeast Bureau is headed by Sung Jen-chiung, who was in charge of an important central government ministry. The East China and Southwest Bureaus, on the other hand, are headed by individuals drawn from the Shanghai municipal and Szechwan provincial party apparatus, respectively. Both are Politburo members.

These bureaus probably do have certain personnel powers and functions. They assist the party center in assessing job performance of provincial leaders. Since responsibilities at the regions are broader

than in the provinces, the regional posts may be a proving grounds for higher posts with the party center.


The staffing pattern at the provincial level is a virtual carbon copy of that in Peiping. Autonomous regions and cities directly under central authority (like Shanghai) are treated as provinces. A provincial congress is elected, and elects in turn a provincial committee to act for the congress when it is not in session. The provincial committee elects a standing committee to act in its stead when it is not in session as well as a secretariat to handle its "daily work."

These provincial posts are important--10 of the 21 Chinese provinces have populations of between 20 and 60 million--and the party center takes no chances. It wrote into the constitution that the number of members of a provincial committee will be set by the Central Committee and that the members of a provincial standing committee and secretariat must be approved by the Central Committee. So must party committee members in key industrial cities and cities with a population of over 500,000 (of which China has some 35).

Like its counterpart in Peiping, the provincial committee has the constitutional authority "to take charge of and allocate party cadres", but the Central Committee establishes the controlling regulations. In practice, effective provincial responsibility over cadres is most likely exercised by the standing committee (for the higher provincial jobs) and by the provincial departments (for lesser posts).

Provincial Committees are empowered to set up their own departments. Most of them have an organization department, the duties of which are determined by the provincial committees. Provincial organization departments are involved, when local conditions and their instructions permit, in the assignment and promotion of cadres coming under provincial control. Provincial departments are under the authority of the provincial party committee, not under the corresponding department at the party center. The latter has only what Peiping terms a "guidance relationship" with its provincial counterparts.

CCP MEMBERSHIP (1921 - 1961)



The staffing of party organizations at the county level is similar to the pattern at the more exalted levels.

Party Personnel Administration

Admission

The party constitution says that membership in the party is open to any Chinese, age 18 and over, who works and does not exploit the labor of others. The entrance process can be initiated by the individual or by the party. He must be sponsored by two full members. In either case, the individual involved must fill out a detailed application. The most important entries involve his family and personal background, communist works he has been influenced by, a personal evaluation of his good and bad points, and a statement as to why he wishes to join the party. He must be approved by a general membership meeting of a party branch. After being accepted by the branch meeting, the application is forwarded to the next higher committee for review. This committee assigns a functionary to examine carefully the candidate's application form and to interview him in detail.

After approval by the committee, the applicant becomes a probationary member of the party. He stays in this status for one year, during which he is subjected to an "elementary party education" and to the close observation of the party branch. When the test year is over, his case again comes before the branch meeting. His party age is computed from the day he is accepted by the branch as a full member, though he must still go through the formality of being approved by the next higher committee. At any point in this process a strong objection by any one involved can kill the applicant's chances.

Admission into the Chinese Communist Party is achieved more easily in the periods when the party runs drives to add new members; for example, there was a big upswing in admissions during the commune and "leap forward" movements in 1958-1959. These are followed by periods of consolidation when entrance requirements are more strenuously applied.

Since 1956 there no longer have been different procedures prescribed for applicants of different class backgrounds. But it is, nevertheless, relatively easy for a Chinese with a "clean" class background--parents who were workers or peasants--to get into the party. Such an individual would be more likely be asked to apply, and he might even find his probationary period shortened. On the other hand, it is not unknown for an applicant with an "unclean" background to be met with delaying tactics which might last several years. Indeed a bad background--a parent who was in the Kuomintang, for example--could in practice preclude admission.

Members in good standing of the Youth League, a sort of junior party organization, are accepted almost automatically. Another rich source of party material is in the ranks of the non-party "activist." This is one of the very best ways for an outsider to come to the favorable notice of a local party boss. An "activist" serves the party by leading the less active masses at study meetings and during production drives.

The qualities which the party wants in its members include an unquestioning zeal, a strong measure of asceticism, and a dash, no more, of individuality. The party wants a man who will place the interests of the party above his own, a man with no aims or ambitions, indeed no life, outside the party. He must demonstrate instantaneous obedience to party discipline. It is his "holy duty" to carry out party policy without reservation even if he disagrees with it, though at the same time he is expected to be skilled in adapting the policy to local peculiarities. He must in all things be an exemplar to the masses, while sharing their "jobs and sorrows, their hard and frugal life." He should display leadership potential.

Of course not all Chinese Communist Party members measure up to these high-flown standards. What the party gets in practice is considerably more limited, especially at the basic levels. Here the party is apt to settle for obedience and political reliability.

Appraisal and Promotion

The basic party organization, the branch, makes periodic appraisals of each of its members. The appraisal process begins with the individual's own analysis of himself. This is then discussed by his branch colleagues who have been observing him and forming views as to his suitability. The "self-criticisms and criticisms" thus collected are supplemented by regular personal interviews between the individual member and one of his party betters. Another higher official may collate and sum up all of this material. Branch appraisals are supposed to take into account the member's personal history and work record, his merits and demerits, his capabilities and limitations. They become a part of a member's permanent party record.

Over a period of time these appraisals enable the party apparatus to make judgments of a member's particular worth and identify those who are ready to be moved to positions of higher responsibility. Although there have been hints that a sort of rough grading system does exist within the party, it is not apparently as firm and well-developed a system as exists in the Chinese government and military. An individual's rank in the party seems largely to be determined by the level of the apparatus at which he works and his duties at that level. There are references, for example, to party secretaries at the county level which suggest that the party regards this as equivalent to a grade designation.

According to party instructions, the selection of cadres for promotion and transfer should proceed on the basis of a systematic plan and on a "unified" --that is, controlled by the higher levels--basis. The entire history and work of the member being considered for reassignment is to be taken into account. His party record, likely to be a voluminous file for any but the newest recruit, will be studied, and the opinions of his superiors, his equals and his subordinates sought. He may be brought in for a personal interview by a ranking member of the office for which he is being considered. Even if he is not selected, the party argues that this sort of screening is good. The individual gains a better understanding of his strengths and weaknesses, while

the party is enabled to place him in his proper spot.

"In our fundamental evaluations of a member's work," Mao has said, "we must establish whether his achievements amount to 30 percent and his mistakes to 70 percent, or vice versa. If his achievements amount to 70 percent, then his work should in the main be approved." Most of the criteria advocated by the party to guide the selection process are, however, highly subjective (e.g., a high degree of communist consciousness) and leave the selectors without much meaningful guidance. Hence, much to the party's professed annoyance, great emphasis is put in practice on seniority and personal relationships. A former party member has recalled that the prime requirement for most any post was to have served a certain length of time in the party. The more responsible the post, the longer the period. Others have testified that the prejudices of the higher cadres constituted a most important factor.

Party writings make it very clear that the leaders want advancement based on other criteria. Guidelines from the Organization Department to party workers involved in the assignment and promotion process stipulate that they should resolutely avoid the practice of assigning and promoting solely on the basis of seniority. Teng Hsiao-ping has called this reliance the most serious defect in the party's cadre policy.

The party says it wants advancement to be based both on the member's "virtue," meaning his ideological reliability, and "ability," meaning his technical qualifications. As the party's role has broadened over the years, and especially since it took over the Chinese mainland, the emphasis put on the second part of the equation has increased. A recent party work, for example, declared that preferment in the Party will increasingly depend on how well the member improves his technical skill. But the party has not, and probably never will, permit the latter to outweigh the former.

Party Education

Great emphasis is placed by the party leaders on their "education" programs. Indeed, a cadre's attitude toward and aptitude for study will be duly

entered on his appraisal forms. "To be lazy about study shows a defective sense of responsibility toward the party," runs a party injunction, which adds that all cadres, old and new, in leading positions or on the lower levels, must study.

Indeed, the need is deep. The Chinese party is the largest in the world. The general educational level of its members is low. At its lower levels, literacy is limited. And the problem is complicated by the fact that members with comparatively good educational backgrounds are not trusted as fully as the "good-hearted" elements with a sound class background but a poor education.

Cadre training programs are basically of two kinds, ideological and technical. The aim is to educate the loyal and convert the educated. The ideological part is the better developed. It is constant, pervasive, repetitious, in all party organs, in schools, in offices, in the armed forces. Wherever a party man goes, no matter how "virtuous" he may be, he will be assigned to a study group. He will be required to attend its regular study meetings, which may average two a week, to discuss approvingly the latest twists and turns of the party line.

These meetings are, from time to time as the party center directs, supplemented by special study sessions of several weeks' duration. One such series was conducted in the early part of 1962 on the duties and rights of party members. Members are, of course, believers when they join and these never-ending doses of indoctrination are intended to prevent backsliding.

The first training offered a party member outside the scope of his own study group is very likely to be at a short course run by one of the basic level organs. Members are rotated thru such schools for one, two or three months of instruction in the basic tenets of communism. He probably will attend such courses a number of times during his service at lower levels. Lecturers may be leading cadres of the unit giving the course, or they may be individuals whose only duty is to provide this instruction.

At the county level, these courses are apt to be given at a regular institution maintained by the county committee. Here leading cadres of the county party organization receive refresher courses and cadres earmarked for such positions receive a more sophisticated version of the instruction at lower levels. For the party is convinced that, the higher a cadre rises, the broader his understanding of communism needs be.

So his ideological education goes on, conceivably right up to his being selected, if his future placement requires it, for a course of study at one of the institutions run by the party's Central Committee, the Higher Party School or the Central Research Institute. These train high theoretical cadres or give them an opportunity for research in the field. They may also give more generalized courses for cadres destined for service in key posts with departments of the Central Committee.

The Central Committee's Propaganda Department plays a big role in all of this ideological training. It provides the study materials, from basic texts by Marx, Engels, Lenin, to collections of Mao's works and the relevant party documents. It is in direct control of the key party publications, the newspaper People's Daily and the magazine Red Flag. It may help by providing guidance on party schooling to the lower levels.

However pressing the need for all of this ideological training, the party also recognizes that party members must be given the opportunity to attain a measure of expertness in the work to which they are assigned. In order fully to deserve the trust placed in them, the party says, members must have more than a talent to "chatter away on political subjects." If a cadre is assigned to work with the peasants, he is expected to study farm technique; if sent to an economic installation, he is expected to learn something of its processes; if sent to oversee scientific research, he is expected to sop up some scientific knowledge.

In order to do this, he may be entered in a regular educational institution such as a middle school, university, or a technical, trade or vocational institute, either as a full or part time

student. One of the wide variety of short courses, offering highly specialized and concentrated instruction in a narrow curriculum, may be the party's choice for him. He may be left to learn as much as he can on the job by picking the brains of the experts working there. He may merely be strongly urged to attend spare-time classes or devote himself to off-duty study. Opportunities for technical training in today's China are limited, but whatever is available is at the party's beck and call.

As an individual moves up in the party, he is expected to broaden out. He will be assigned different duties, in accordance with the party needs, and will probably receive related training. And he may in time become one of the party's cherished "versatile hands," a trusted party man with a variety of posts in his background who is ready for bigger things.

Party Incentives

The primary attraction of party membership is probably the fact that the party runs things. This cannot escape the notice of anyone in China. Party membership opens doors to positions in government, in the military, in universities, in fact everywhere. The highest, or at least the most powerful, positions are invariably occupied by party figures. A young Chinese who wishes to get ahead will doubtless regard party membership as the indispensable key and work for the day of his admission. The party leadership regards this as a base motive for joining.

Promotion is probably the main material incentive offered the party men. There are undeniable perquisites that go with party office. The higher the office, the greater the perquisites. While direct wages are pegged to equivalent non-party levels, advantages in housing, medical care, and recreational facilities accrue to party officials. They are also apt to get a break on scarce items like meat, sugar, vegetable oil, cloth and cigarettes. It would be risky business for a restaurant to fail to pay special attention to a party boss.

But the road to the perquisites of this type is a long and arduous one. On the way up, he will have to be sustained largely by less material incentives, like the comfort of being one of an acknowledged elite which has a mission of doing something about building China. Beyond this psychological

balm, there is the practical authority which his membership confers on him. There is always some individual, some group, for the party man to "lead."





If considerations of personal advantage over the long pull are not sufficient to keep the party man bent to the party's will, there is the constant threat of prolonged sessions of criticism and self-criticism. These "educational" sessions can be long and unbelievably tedious. It is, according to many who have gone thru such sessions, most difficult to withstand these partly mental, partly physical, onslaughts. If an individual does resist, the party can move on to disciplinary action. Punishments are: 1) warning, 2) serious warning, 3) removal from party posts, 4) retention for observation within the party, and 5) expulsion from the party.

There is also the possibility of being sent down to a production unit, usually a farm, for a period of labor reform. In fact, the party regards this as such a good scheme that a cadre, even a leading cadre, can find himself assigned to one of these periods of "proletarianization" without his having done a thing wrong.

Other threats, of course, hang over the party member. He can be turned over to the state supervisory apparatus, which can, if the offense is serious enough, mete out more extreme forms of punishment.

The dangers of running afoul of the control apparatus are particularly great when the party center is running one of its periodic campaign to "rectify" party members. Then they can conceivably be charged with any one of a variety of vague, ill-defined sins. They must beware and re-double their efforts to satisfy their party betters. The utility of this sort of negative incentive should not be underestimated.

PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICES IN CHINA

OFFICES	FUNCTION
CHAIRMAN 	Controls 60-odd top level government appointments
PREMIER 	
STATE COUNCIL	Controls 2,000-odd second echelon executive positions
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR	Administers State welfare programs, veterans affairs, civilian labor for public works.
PERSONNEL BUREAU	Implements welfare and wage policies, processes and manages personnel actions and records
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMMISSION	Plans development and training programs in scientific and technical fields
SPECIALISTS WORK BUREAU	Controls Assignment of scientists and other highly-trained technicians
STATE PLANNING COMM. 	Determines job priorities among govt. agencies
STATE ECONOMIC COMM. 	
BUREAU FOR THE ADMIN. OF GOVT. OFFICES	Administers Security and living accommodations of high officials
FOREIGN EXPERTS BUREAU	Contracts for and assigns foreign technicians
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION	Determines first job assignments of college graduates

III. STAFFING THE GOVERNMENT

The Chinese Communists conceive of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the executive instrumentality for carrying out policies decided by the party. The task they give the government is to help formulate and then execute plans for the implementation of the party's general line. This is a huge job since the government has to regulate not only such normal national security functions as defense, diplomacy and peace and order, but also a wide range of activities taken over by the communists, from industrial production to domestic and foreign trade, sports and even radio broadcasting. As a result, China's bureaucratic apparatus is immense.

The party organization remains separate and distinct from that of the government. The party as an organization stays clear of actual governmental administration. Party members are, however, spotted all through the government, from top to bottom. It is through their efforts that, in the words of a veteran communist, "the administrative agencies of the government are made to accept policies of the party and turn them into policies of the government."

Staffing Requirements for Senior Posts

The nominal number-one job in the government, the Chairman of the Republic, is largely a procedural and ceremonial post. The Chairman is the formal chief of state. He has no direct control, by virtue of his government position, over the State Council or the ministries, which together handle the real administrative chores of the government. However, in Communist China, the chief of state has in fact been a figure of commanding importance by virtue of his party position. The first Chairman of the Republic, Mao Tse-tung, resigned in 1959 and was succeeded by Liu Shao-chi.

The chief executive is the premier, the principal officer of the State Council. The post is held by Chou En-lai. The State Council includes 16 vice premiers (one of whom, Peng Teh-huai, is in disfavor and inactive), and some 30 ministers and heads of commissions plus a secretary general. This group has

such authority as is given the government to make high-level decisions necessary for carrying out national security policies. The premier and 12 of the 16 vice premiers are members of the Politburo; the other four are high ranking Central Committee members.

Broad functional control under the State Council is exercised by its six staff offices. These operate as more or less permanent coordinating committees, with a varying number of related ministries under their purview. They are the government counterparts of the party's central departments. Besides these staff offices, the State Council's Secretariat and the premier's office provide general coordinative functions. The Secretariat serves as the official link between the council and provincial and local administrations. The premier's office contains his personal staff performing such functions as he directs.

What does the party center look for in the men it assigns to jobs on the State Council? Mao Tse-tung and his confederates are doubtless looking for individuals who: 1) have a long and spotless party history; 2) have a demonstrated competence in the administration of complex problems and large numbers of people; and 3) have some acquaintance and experience with the specific affairs of the office.

The degree to which the first qualification predominates is illustrated by the fact that 75 percent of the State Council membership is made up of party men. These are, for the most part, members of the party's Central Committee and are thus, in the party's judgment, its best career officers and administrators. Membership on the Central Committee identifies a man who has spent virtually all his adult life in the management of increasingly important affairs. Since 1949 this experience has, for some of the them, included nationwide responsibilities in certain fields.

Non-communists have been appointed to head ministries in the central government, but never to those involving national security functions. Non-communists head ministries which handle things like water conservancy and postal services. Even then,

the non-communist minister will inevitably have a first vice minister who is a reliable party man and acts as a minister in everything but name. Some ministries, such as the ministries of foreign affairs, public security, and defense do not use non-party members in any but the most menial positions.

Party members predominate even at the second level. Over 80 percent of the 300 vice ministers and vice chairman of commissions are party men. Party membership for the bureaucracy as a whole is more difficult to determine. An Tzu-wen reported that in 1956 one-third of the total number of cadres working at the county level or above were either party or youth league members. It may be that the proportion of party to non-party cadres cited by An could apply to the bureaucracy as a whole: the same proportion has been noted in the USSR.

It might be noted that party membership accounts for only 4 percent of the general population of over 15 years of age. The concentration of party members grows steadily heavier as you move up in the governmental machinery until it reaches 100 percent at the level of the vice premier and above.

Structure for Staffing Government Offices

The State Council

The 1954 constitution of the Chinese People's Republic declares that the National People's Congress is the "highest organ of state power." Its more than 1200 deputies are elected. Sessions of the congress have been short, less frequent than called for in the constitution, and confined to rubber-stamping actions taken elsewhere. The congress elects the Chairman of the People's Republic of China as well as a Standing Committee to be its "permanent working organ" when it is not in session. The present Standing Committee has some 60 members.

The chairman formally appoints the premier, subject to the approval of the National People's Congress. He appoints, on the recommendation of the premier, the other members of the State-Council --the vice premiers, ministers, heads of commissions and the secretary general. After the premier's nominations have been "decided" by a congress (or its Standing Committee), they are formally appointed

to their jobs by the chairman. The provisions for congressional approval are no more than window-dressing for decisions made at the party center.

The chairman appoints in addition a number of other ranking officials in national security jobs, such as the Chief of the General Staff, the directors of the main departments in the Ministry of National Defense, the president and vice presidents of the Academy of Sciences. While the standing committee is empowered to appoint and remove ambassadors and heads of mission abroad, the chairman dispatches and recalls these plenipotentiary representatives. Although these appointments are the responsibility of the chairman, they are likely made upon the recommendation of the premier. The total number of top posts requiring the nomination and appointment of the chairman and premier probably numbers less than 100, roughly half of which are jobs controlling national security programs.

The Second Level

Selection of the second echelon of government executives is legally the prerogative of the State Council. This second echelon includes the directors of the important staff offices of the State Council, the heads of specialized agencies of the State Council, the deputy ministers and assistant ministers, the commission vice chairman and members, as well as all chiefs and deputies of the divisions, bureaus, and offices which make up the ministries. In the military field, the appointing responsibility of the Council extends to commanders and political commissars at the division level (more than 300 positions). In the foreign field it includes embassy counselors and consul generals. The State Council appoints all key personnel in the important financial, commercial, or industrial enterprises administered by the 25 economic ministries. Important administrative posts in the field of higher education are also controlled by the State Council. Altogether the State Council probably controls a minimum of 2,000 executive jobs in the government. All of them require reference to the party before being finalized.

In addition to specific responsibilities for appointing administrative personnel, the State Council

is ultimately responsible for the government's staffing policies. The State Council, for example, as a part of each long term and annual plan makes an allocation of manpower resources according to nationally determined priorities and, in effect, programs the development of new skills needed in China's industrialization.

The Secretary General and Secretariat of the State Council are key positions in the exercise of these council responsibilities. The Secretary General is Hsi Chung-hsun, a high-ranking Central Committee member and a vice premier. Prior to moving to Peiping, he had been an important figure in party affairs in Northwest China. He is assisted by ten deputies who are all party personalities. More than half of them have concurrent responsibilities in the party personnel machine. One of them, Kung Tzu-jung, holds the following positions in the central departments of the party: head of the Committee for Central State Organs, member of the Control Commission, and deputy director of the Party Secretariat's Staff Office. Five of the deputies hold concurrent responsibilities in important State Council personnel offices.

The Secretariat has a special Personnel Division which appears to be responsible for enforcing personnel procedures, processing personnel actions, and maintaining personnel files on the employees working directly for the State Council. In addition, Premier Chou's own office assists him in making personnel and policy decisions.

Government personnel administration on lower levels is highly fragmented. The Ministry of Personnel, organized in 1950 shortly after the government was first established, had comparatively broad responsibilities for government personnel selection and assignment at a time when the new regime was busy filling its offices. It was closely tied with the party's Organization Department. Like the Organization Department, the ministry has been downgraded. In 1954 it was reduced to a specialized agency of the State Council; and in 1959 it was placed under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. During the period, other, more specialized organizations were created by the State Council to handle aspects of personnel work, such as training, job allocation, or various specialized groups of personnel, such as scientists and technicians.

Today, the General Personnel Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs performs the following functions for the government bureaucracy as a whole:

1. It implements the wage and welfare policies of the State Council and performs other personnel work assigned it by the council.
2. It drafts personnel regulations and supervises the establishments of tables of organization for offices of central government.
3. It processes personnel actions, including transfers, appointments and removals of personnel in government offices down to the county level.
4. It maintains personnel records.
5. It processes the transfer and job placement of demobilized military personnel.
6. It maintains liaison with and evaluates the work of personnel offices throughout the central government and in local governments at the provincial, autonomous region, and special municipality level.

The subordination of the Personnel Bureau to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1959 served to correlate the Bureau's general responsibility for control of the bureaucracy with the Ministry's responsibilities for veterans affairs, the mass mobilization of civilian labor crews for public works projects, and the administration of state welfare and relief programs. At the time of the merger, the Director of the Personnel Bureau, Chang Yi-pai, was made a Vice Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Chang has been associated with high level personnel work since government was set up.

Specialized Personnel

In 1956 the administration of government personnel was compartmentalized in an apparent effort to improve upon the use of highly educated and trained Chinese--especially in high priority programs. The administration of two kinds of personnel

EMPLOYMENT OF "SPECIALISTS" IN CHINA
IN 1955

	<u>Number Employed</u>	<u>% With College Degrees</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,700,000</u>	
I Teachers	1,630,000	8
A. Prof. and Lecturers at Higher Ed. Inst.	18,000	96
II Engineering and Technical Personnel	600,000	15
A. Management Personnel	15,000	6
B. Engineers	32,000	
III Medical Personnel	370,000	8
A. Chinese or Western Trained Doctors	50,000	49
IV Scientific and Research Personnel	11,000	69
A. "Researchers" or assistants	654	98
V Cultural and Artistic Personnel	88,000	10

with critical skills--"specialists" and visiting bloc technicians--was divorced from the general administrative system in 1956 and turned over to independent agencies of the State Council, the Specialists Work Bureau and the Foreign Experts Bureau.

The Specialists Work Bureau is today part of the Scientific and Technological Commission. It is responsible for the assignment, promotion and transfer of "specialists"--defined by the Chinese Communists as scientific workers, engineers, educators, doctors, and health technicians, as well as important cultural and artistic workers. The bureau may concern itself directly only with persons who have actual work experience. The bureau may also have been charged with carrying out a 1956 plan to register all scientific and technological personnel, and with keeping it up to date.

Advisory functions of the bureau include:

1. To investigate unemployed "advanced intellectuals" and place them in the state apparatus.
2. To investigate the assignment and working conditions of specialists and make recommendations to the State Council for improvement.
3. To investigate the implementation of policies and laws governing the use of specialists, and attempt to solve their problems and promote their fullest use.
4. To work out plans with government departments for the employment of students and specialists returning to China from non-Communist countries.

The second bureau established in 1956 by the State Council to handle special personnel requirements, the Foreign Experts Bureau, was designed specifically to take care of bloc experts. Prior to 1960 such personnel numbered in the thousands. The Soviet specialists left China over two years ago, but a few hundred satellite technicians have remained. The bureau still functions. It investigates the technical and scientific specialization of foreign countries

(both communist and non-communists) in the light of China's needs. It retains responsibility for engaging foreign specialists, arranging their assignment in China, providing living accommodations, and writing letters of commendation at the termination of their service.

Another unit at the State Council level with important responsibilities for personnel administration is the Bureau for the Administration of Government Offices. This agency provides living accommodations and security for top level government cadres, which probably includes the 50 officials of the State Council and may well include other important personnel in the ministries, commissions, and special agencies.

Ministries and Commissions

Each ministry and commission has limited responsibility for locating, training, assigning, and promoting its rank and file. The ministries carry out this responsibility through personnel bureaus, the directors of which, like every important administrative office in a ministry, are appointed by the State Council.

The duties of a ministerial personnel bureau include the processing of personnel actions, maintaining personnel records, arranging leave and changes of assignment. They provide general services such as briefing newly assigned people and arranging for their housing, clothing, and travel.

In one of the most important national security ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, virtually all executive positions in Peiping (at least 100 and perhaps as many as 200 people) as well as responsible officials in the foreign service (an additional 200 positions at a minimum) are administered by the State Council.

The ministry's personnel unit controls appointments and assignments to middle- and junior-level posts as well as service positions. The ministry's general services department, rather than its personnel unit negotiates with other government agencies for people trained in security work and assigns and transfers the more than 200 people working as couriers, code clerks, and physical security officers according to needs as fixed by the ministry.

Government Personnel Administration

Recruitment and Assignment

Although the staffing objectives and machinery of the US and Communist China contain many similarities, placement procedures differ significantly. In a democratic system, the government must compete with other employers for an individual's services, and personal preferences play a large part in placement. In Communist China professional, semi-professional, and vocational school graduates are given little alternative but to accept service in a job assigned by the state.

Professionals entering the labor force from higher educational institutions are assigned positions by the institutions on the basis of rosters prepared by the ministry which administers the institutions. The Ministry of Education administers general liberal arts schools, and the Ministry of National Defense and economic ministries run technical and scientific institutes.

Students earmarked for jobs in national security organs generally have had their course of study sponsored by a specific organization. Or they may have been hand picked before graduation for a special assignment. For those not so chosen normal placement procedure begins with the posting of a roster of positions which the institution is responsible for filling on its bulletin board. Each student is permitted to indicate three choices. The institution in theory considers the student's choice. In practice, however, the institution is guided primarily by other considerations, such as the state's needs, the student's class background and his scholastic rating.

Although acceptance of state assignments is virtually mandatory, there is little need for compulsion. By the time a student graduates from an institute of higher education in Communist China, he has undergone a long process of mental preparation to put duty above personal considerations. He will probably be either ambitious or sincere enough to make personal sacrifices in the interest of furthering his career. Even if he lacks such motivations,

a student has no ready alternative. The following account of a student's attempt to refuse an assignment was written by an intellectual who fled China.

"There was an actual case of a medical student who after graduation did not go to the frontier area assigned to him but went home instead to help his father keep shop. He was free to go home, of course: 'no one could force him to do anything in a socialist country'.... He enjoyed several weeks of leisure with his family which he could financially well afford, but one day two classmates came to see him and, after tea and remarks on the weather, they explained that they thought he should 'follow the leadership' and go to his assigned work. 'In socialist societies,' they told him, 'no one should call his skill his own, because without the society a man could not be what he was. The Government spent so much money on the school we studied in. Therefore,...' The next day two other classmates came to persuade him; 'In socialist societies no one can call his skill his own...'; the third day three others came; 'In socialist countries no one can call his skill his own...'; the fourth day one of the two who came the first day came: 'The government spent so much on the school we studied in' In any society there are some people with exceptional temperaments, and the Communists take care of them. This medical student persisted in shaking his head; and his classmates persisted in coming. Every afternoon he was subjected to a lecture which went on for hours: 'In socialist societies no one can call his skill his own....' At the end of two months he came to think that this was worse than any frontier region could be, and promised to report to the Committee of Party Members in the school."

Refusal to accept a job assigned by the state amounts to professional suicide, particularly for a young student just starting out. It results in automatic isolation from an employment system which controls all significant job opportunities in the entire country. Although an individual may eventually find some kind of employment, he has in effect placed himself under governmental "supervision", which itself can be a serious matter. His original refusal to accept a state assignment has become a permanent part of his personnel record. Even if he relents, as the reluctant medical student did, his future assignments, salary, and promotional opportunities have been irreparably blighted.

Offices directly involved in national security have the highest priority in personnel recruitment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, usually has first call on students in the social sciences, in foreign languages and in area studies. It takes the largest part of the graduating class from the country's basic foreign service training school. Those selected by the ministry from other institutions are generally out of the top half of their classes. An assignment to the ministry "must be complied with" and is accompanied by a thorough security check. Almost all professional employees are believed to be members of the party or the Youth League. The Ministry also enjoys a high priority in filling its personnel needs from other agencies.

The nation's scientific effort also gets priority attention in the assignment of better students. This effort is planned and overseen by the 30-35 divisions, including divisions for atomic energy and national defense, of the Scientific and Technological Commission. Most of the actual scientific work is, however, handled by the Academy of Sciences, in specialized academies run by individual ministries and in industry or at the universities. The importance of the Academy of Sciences in this effort is indicated by the fact that a principal part of the nation's research and development in such vital fields as nuclear physics and missiles is carried out at various institutes of the academy. The academy ensures a supply of qualified personnel by running its own training programs in its own schools. The academy doubtless gets the pick of the students trained.

Transfer and Promotion

Once assigned to a critical job or agency, an individual has almost no horizontal mobility--at least not on his own initiative. The system which forces him into a niche, keeps him there. Transfers, like assignments, are arranged largely on the basis of the state's need and to refuse a transfer initiated by the state is likely to be detrimental to one's career.

Good performance or personal contacts can bring an individual to the attention of another agency with a clearly higher priority, and transfers can usually be arranged at the instigation of such an organization. Poor performance can result in a transfer either to less critical agencies or to less important responsibilities within the same agency.

There are also lateral transfers from agencies responsible for developing particular skills. This kind of transfer occurs frequently, in the national security field, from military to civilian agencies. Special police and security offices, for example, in the governmental structure are usually staffed by military veterans with special training in this kind of work. Organizations needing personnel trained in secure communications procedures recruit almost exclusively from the military. Other specialized agencies, such as the Bureau of National Statistics and the Ministry of Public Security, train specialists on a continuing basis and make them available to other government agencies as normal placement procedure.

Although it is not impossible to arrange one's own transfer in Communist China, such transfers are not common. The government does entertain requests from individuals for reassignment, though probably not from the national security field. The best reason for such a request, from the government's point of view, is that the individual's speciality is not being used. Misplacement does occur. For example, at one time a reported 10 percent of the "advanced intellectuals" in the employ of one ministry were holding down jobs which did not utilize their specialized training.

Promotional prospects in the governmental service depend on much the same criteria as in the party. The first concern of the authorities is in most cases likely to be political reliability. Like his colleagues in the party, the non-party professional has to attend regular study meetings. Though these are generally neither as frequent nor as intensive as for the party man, the non-party professional finds he must also express his opinions on the issues under discussion. This, of course, gives big brother in the party a chance to measure his political attitude. If it is judged inadequate, his other qualifications will have to be outstanding before he will have a chance to be recommended for promotion.

Still, professional excellence probably does count for more here than it does in the case of the purely party man. A man could conceivably advance quite high in an economic or scientific institution on professional merit. But he would find, ultimately, that he was closed off from the top posts unless or until he was accepted into the party.

Veterans' Preference

Veterans from the armed forces are employed in large numbers at all levels of responsibility in the Chinese government. Military retirement laws dating from the mid-1950's provide that all demobilized military personnel must, if they are physically fit and under 55 years of age, take job assignments arranged for them. These assignments, like those of civilian professionals are virtually compulsory. High-ranking officers or personnel with special qualifications are usually assigned jobs before they leave the army. If an individual has no particular skills of use to the government or the party he is sent home. The personnel department of the government in his local area is responsible for providing him with a job. Some sort of employment is arranged, from a comfortable spot in an academic institution to difficult manual labor in factories or on farms.

Ex-soldiers also receive special salary considerations. Their military rank is converted to a roughly equal civilian grade. The actual salary

paid a veteran is determined by a combination of this grade and his length of military service. A veteran can thus draw a higher salary than a non-veteran in the same job. One other factor contributes to veteran's preference in Communist China. The armed forces political indoctrination program is one of the regime's most effective. It tends to make veterans, many of whom are party members, especially reliable. Veterans are therefore likely to be considered for responsible positions ahead of non-veterans.

In-service Training

Many of the ministries and commissions of the Chinese government run in-service training courses for their personnel, usually at specialized institutions in which they have an interest. One such institution is the Chinese Institute for International Relations in Peiping. Financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education, it is under the operational control of the party. It provides training in international affairs, foreign languages and area studies. Selection for study at the institute is considered a mark of distinction and the herald of higher positions to come.

Most of the Institute's 600 students are drawn from party cadres of the low and middle levels, foreign service officers who have already had a tour abroad or employees of the ministry, and employees of other government and military offices--all of whom receive their salary while attending the school. It does accept some highly qualified middle school graduates. Entrance requirements read like the requirements for party membership--political reliability, a family background untainted by wealth or political ties with the Kuomintang, and no foreign connections.

The curriculum of the Institute is organized around a two- to three-year program for foreign ministry officers who have already served abroad, and a four- to five-year program for training language and area specialists. It is based on the study program of the institute's Soviet counterpart. Studies include basic academic courses (geography, history, law), political theory courses (Marxism-Leninism, the history of the Chinese revolutions, dialectical materialism), foreign affairs (history of international

PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT CATEGORIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

(Approximate job classification systems in civil service, military, industrial, and academic posts)

Civil Service		Military (Officers)	Industry		Academic	
(Job description)	Grade		Management	Engineers	Admin.	Faculty
<div>Central Government Leaders</div> <div>Governors of Provinces</div> <div>Bureau & Dept. Heads</div> <div>Ambassadors</div> <div>Office Chiefs</div> <div>Section Chiefs</div>	Chairman, CPR	1				
	2					
	Staff Office Heads	3				
	4	Marshal				
	Ministers	5				
	6	Sr. General				
	7	Col. Gen.			Some University Presidents	
	8	Lt. Gen.			Some V. Presidents	Professors
	9	Maj. Gen.				
	10		Managers	Grade 1		Ast. Prof.
	11	Sr. Col.		Grade 2		
	12			Grade 3		Lecturers
	13	Colonel	Dep. Managers			
	14	Lt. Colonel	Office Heads	Grade 4		
	15	Major	Section Heads	Grade 5		
	16	Sr. Captain	Dep. Sect. Heads	Grade 6		Ast. Lecturers
	17	Captain		Technicians		
	18		Sales Representatives and Shop Foremen			
	19	1st Lt.				
	20	2nd Lt.				
(Professionals)	21					
Recent additions to grade structure	22					
	23					
	24					
	25					
	26					
	27					
	28					
	29					
	30					
	31					
	32					

politics and economic relations, international public and private law, the history of Chinese diplomacy), and foreign languages (English, French, Russian, German, Spanish, and Arabic). The major emphasis of the institute is on political theory. The major language effort is on English.

Government Incentives

The promotional possibilities for professionals in Communist China range from an entering grade 21 for a college graduate to an effective ceiling at about grade 11. A handful of top executives hold the ten super grades. The wage differential between grade 11 and grade 21 in Communist China is about the same as exists in the US civil service system between the professional entering grade, GS-5, and the top regular grade, GS-15. Wage levels for professionals in the government have been generally stable and promotions slow. The government wage structure was last overhauled in 1956.

A government professional gets certain perquisites which determine his actual standard of living. Emoluments in housing, food, and clothing allowances are allowed high level officials. Lesser officials in certain kinds of work, such as personnel whose jobs bring them into frequent contact with foreigners receive better living allowances than the average employee of the same grade. Welfare benefits in the form of medical services and schools for dependents also are linked to professional status and grade.

Housing is at a premium in China. The higher one's grade the better the chance of being able to live with one's family, to obtain attractive accommodations, privacy, and enough equipment for relative comfort. For the many government employees whose jobs do not permit them to live with their families, the regime has a leave system which allows an individual to spend two to three weeks a year, or four to five weeks every two years with his family.

On top of this, persons employed by organizations responsible for national security reportedly receive special attention in the allocation of daily necessities. The armed forces receive excellent treatment in comparison with the population at

large, and the relatively high standard of living of employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs compared to other government functionaries has been noted by visitors to Peiping.

The Chinese Communist regime employs to advantage certain non-material incentives. It offers, for example, idealistic young people a chance to participate in the vital and challenging job of modernizing China. This factor is known to have played a large part in the return of hundreds of educated Chinese from the US and Europe in the early 1950's. It is a factor heavily emphasized in university-level indoctrination programs.

A second non-material incentive is access to literature that has not been pre-masticated by the regime's propaganda apparatus.

The government's awards system seems designed more to promote loyalty to the regime than improvements in efficiency and performance. This system now in use provides for the granting of commendations, prizes, cash, grade raises and promotions on the following grounds: 1) loyalty to the job; 2) superior or model performance of duties; 3) observance of discipline; 4) suggestions, innovations, and inventions which contribute to the national welfare; 5) actions protecting government property or preventing loss to the government; and 6) fighting illegal activity. Four out of the six are reflections of political reliability rather than outstanding professional achievement.

There are also regulations on the books which are specifically designed to reward outstanding professional achievement. Under these, original contributions in both natural and social science are afforded national recognition and cash awards. The only publicized use of these awards occurred nearly six years ago.

Of course, there is the other side of the incentive coin. The government civil servant can fall afoul of the government's supervisory apparatus quite as easily as a party man can be enmeshed in his, and for equally capricious reasons. There is no legal code in Communist China. There is a system of courts in China, but the courts are

not independent; they are only another arm of the executive. There is also a system of public prosecutors, whose chief task it is to check on government offices and employees to see that state regulations are observed by all administrative agencies, officials and the public at large.

The major responsibility for maintaining public order and policing the governmental apparatus, however, rests in the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Public Security. Interior is believed to take care of administrative cases involving government agencies and officials, to investigate how government decisions are being implemented, and to detect neglect of duty or violations of regulations. The Ministry of Public Security performs the general police function vis-a-vis the public. It has the largest and best trained investigative force, which is apparently used from time to time by other supervisory organs of party and government. These organs, primed to act at the whim of the central authorities, provide an important, if negative, slice of any government employee's incentive.

IV. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

The present leaders of the Chinese Communist Party clearly recognize that the country's armed forces, the largest single component of national security personnel in China, constitute the keystone of their past and future power. They take elaborate measures to assure the tightest possible party control over the military. They regard the proper staffing of the military establishment as a vitally important vehicle of this control. As Mao has remarked, "the principle is for the party to direct the gun and not for the gun to direct the party."

The final say in party policy toward the armed forces rests with Mao and his colleagues on the Standing Committee. The formulation of general military policy for the party is, however, entrusted to the Military Affairs Committee, one of the most potent of the party's central organs. Key members of the committee hold the top posts in the Ministry of National Defense, which stands at the apex of the purely military chain of command. Trusted party men hold all top military posts.

The party has provided itself with two further checkreins over the armed forces at all levels. The first is the extension of party committees, similar to those in civilian organs, to the military. The second is the system of political officers under the General Political Department in the armed forces. Every military unit, at least as far down as the company level, has both a party committee and a political officer. This provides the party with both horizontal control, from civilian to military party committees on the same level, and vertical control, through the General Political Department's political officer system.

The Military Affairs Committee

On this body Mao Tse-tung has gathered his most trusted old line military leaders and political officers still active in the armed forces. It is likely that the marshals who helped Mao to his successes in the revolution are all on the committee. The names are a roster of old revolutionary heroes;

Lin Piao, Liu Po-cheng, Lo Jung-huan, Ho Lung, Nieh Jung-chen, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Yeh Chien-ying. Mao probably sits in on the more important committee sessions; Lin Piao is probably the effective operating chieftan.

Over the years this group of men scored many victories by following the accepted Maoist precepts of party primacy. They still tend to look first and foremost to ideological purity and political dependability in determining individual qualifications for military posts, and can be expected to try to keep a firm lid on creeping professionalism in the armed forces.

In at least one instance, however, the question of an individual's political reliability crept right into the ranks of the committee. Between 1957 and 1959 Peng Teh-huai, Minister of National Defense and a leading figure on the committee, spearheaded a group which attempted to "regularize" the armed forces, i.e., to emphasize professionalism in the officer corps in part at the expense of political subservience. The party, considering this a "purely military point of view", sacked Peng and his supporters. Peng's reported attempt to elicit Soviet support contributed to his downfall.

Remnants of Peng's ideas continue to annoy the more orthodox leaders. Some officers have apparently continued to argue that the "suddenness and complexity" of modern warfare render the party committee system in the armed forces dangerously cumbersome and inefficient. Mao's supporters respond that officers holding such views "estrangle themselves from politics...and regard the army as a thing above class and above politics." Even in the present era of military dependence on technology, Mao and his supporters say it is possible for all military plans to be fulfilled by depending on the traditional Communist officer's "courage, self-confidence, fighting ability, esprit de corps." They conclude that today's officer must still be a "militant revolutionary" who subordinates himself to the party and relies for inspiration and practical guidance on the military doctrines expounded in Mao's works.

In an effort to strengthen the approved characteristics in the officer corps, Peiping holds up as exemplars the present members of the Military Affairs Committee. Peiping has specifically excluded them along with all senior generals, from mandatory retirement regulations. Officers at all levels are encouraged to study the memoirs of these leaders, and are given to understand that they should model themselves and pattern their careers on the example of these old heroes.

As attrition begins to remove these aging committeemen from the scene, their replacements will doubtless be judged first on political allegiance to the present party leaders, and secondly on military qualifications.

Some observers have noted that apparently able Chinese Communist military officers fail to advance in grade and position as rapidly as would normally be expected. There can be no doubt that a failure to impress the party leaders who make the promotions with a proper revolutionary spirit has in many cases been responsible. Testifying to the importance of party-oriented thinking in advancement to the top military echelons is the fact that more than half of the present members of the Military Affairs Committee were once political officers in the armed forces. One of them, Lin Piao, who is also the current Minister of National Defense, possesses a brilliant combat record but is also extensively experienced in political work in the army; another, Lo Jui-ching, who is also the present Chief of Staff, is a man who made his reputation in security work.

The General Political Department

The other major organization through which the party exercises control and surveillance is the General Political Department of the armed forces. While organizationally under the Ministry of Defense, the General Political Department in practice enjoys a rather special position. As the senior party agency within the armed forces, it has its own separate channels of command and administration. It is the only organization on its level to which the party constitution devotes a separate article. This article states that the General Political Department will, under the direct leadership of the Central

Committee, "take charge of the ideological and organizational work of the party in the army." In fulfilling this role, the General Political Department is responsible for all propaganda, education and cultural activities within the armed forces. It also has a controlling say in personnel matters.

The political officers which it assigns to each unit of the armed forces are responsible only to the political department, not to any military commander. Except in the most extreme combat emergency, the political officer must approve an operational order before it can be implemented.

One of the major ways in which the department effects the party's will is through its powers in controlling promotions, transfers, leave, and efficiency reports. It also is in charge of the indoctrination of military personnel, a more thoroughgoing program than is inflicted on other government workers.

The man last noted as head of the department, Tan Cheng, has been out of favor for several years. Though not formally removed, he is doubtless no longer trusted to administer the department's delicate and vital functions. It is more likely that one of the senior figures of the Military Affairs Committee does this. Either Lo Jung-huan, who has had many years of loyal service as top political man in the military, or Hsiao Hua, who is nominally the deputy director of the department, probably now exercises real departmental authority.

The Ministry of National Defense

Operating the defense establishment under the direction of these party bodies are the Ministry of National Defense and the central departments--the General Staff Department, the General Rear Services Department, the General Training Department and the General Cadres (personnel) Department. The top jobs in all of these organs are controlled by Mao and the party center, and the incumbents are trusted party men.

Professional military qualifications, however, begin to play a slightly more important role at the second level in the ministry. There is, for example, a rough balance between men with preponderant military experience and men with preponderant political

backgrounds among the vice ministers of national defense and the deputy chiefs of staff. It is at this level that the special representatives of the air force and the navy begin to be heard.

No premium is put on formal academic education in the ministry: indeed, the average is quite low. The rise of better schooled officers, now at more junior levels, will inevitably alter the situation in the future.

Below the deputy level in the central departments of the ministry, changes in personnel and infusion of new blood since 1950 have been sufficient to give a clearer picture of overall Chinese Communist military staffing policies. Most of the officers now holding posts at this level are long-time specialists in their fields--armor, artillery, training, logistics, etc. Still top party leaders, possibly acting on the recommendations of party branch committees in the Peiping headquarters, almost certainly pass judgment on appointments at this level. Regulations provide for the command of military regions, districts, and armies by officers of lieutenant general grade or above. Divisions are commanded by major generals. They are appointed by the State Council with the approval of the top party leadership which naturally wishes to assure that the selections work against the development of "independent kingdoms" reminiscent of the pre-communist warlord period.

Regiments and battalions are commanded by colonels, and companies by captains. The appointment and transfer of all field grade officers is officially the duty of the ministry. Its selections are probably reviewed, prior to being formalized, by the general political department and/or the unit party committees. Staffing at the company level is the responsibility of the regional military commander, or the chief of the appropriate branch of the service, and is probably checked through the party apparatus.

Peiping keeps a full book on the training, experience, and qualifications of officers which is used along with political criteria as the basis for promotion at field and company level. The regime has said little about personal qualities desirable in an officer. It is clear, however, that

emphasis is put on men of action who have an ability to act independently in a military situation and carry through actions once started. Emphasis on these factors may be motivated in part by the probability that insistence on political acceptability among officers has caused many of them to adopt a play-it-safe attitude which in some cases tends to sap needed military initiative.

Seniority is a factor of great importance in field and company grade promotions. Advancement to the rank of senior colonel requires a certain period of service in the next lower grade. A lesser period is required for advancement to lower ranks. Time-in-service stipulations are not immutable, however, and may be waived for especially meritorious officers.

Overstaffing

Top-heavy staffs are a burden to both Chinese Communist field and headquarters military units. The problem was made acute in 1955-1956 when the regime introduced some Soviet staffing practices alongside the existing Chinese structure. Although wholesale cutbacks were made in 1957 and in 1960, the process amounted basically to a reshuffling and reassignment of personnel and probably only a token number of officers were actually retired or placed in reserve status. The Peiping regime retains a high number of general officers in proportion to total strength. The present ratio--some 2,000 generals to a total strength of 2,600,000--is considerably higher than the current average in the better Western armies.

Training

In the old days when the Chinese Communist army was still largely a guerrilla force, military training was left almost entirely to the whims of the individual commander. As a result it was piecemeal and haphazard. By contrast, regular political indoctrination schools have been a feature of the military scene since earliest days. In 1950, Peiping set about to establish a centralized military training system modeled for the most part on Soviet counterparts. It also expanded political schooling. Judged by Western standards, the program is still sketchy, elementary, and heavily political.

The closest equivalent to a western command and staff college is the Nanking Military Institute. Here facilities for officer training operated by the Chinese Nationalists have been taken over and expanded. Promising upper rank field officers whom the regime considers good prospects for advancement to general officer status apparently form the main bulk of the student body. Both political courses and military science subjects are taught. Courses run from eighteen months to four years.

Several establishments in Peiping, the People's Liberation Army Political Academy and the Academy of Military Sciences, appear to constitute a very rough approximation of our own war college system. The former is perhaps the top institution for political instruction connected with the armed forces. Some formal academic training is included in the curriculum, and regular classes are graduated. Both senior political and military officers, including some general officers, receive advanced training at the Institute.

The Academy of Military Science was set up in 1958 and charged with bringing the latest scientific and technical developments into the study of military science in the Chinese armed forces. Its founding was an obvious effort by the regime to try to prepare the Chinese Communist armed forces to cope with the demands of modern technological warfare, even if they were not yet equipped to fight such a war. It probably supervises research into advanced weaponry and doctrine on its use, and lectures senior military officers on these topics.

Another organization apparently involved in this field is the Military Engineering Academy which reportedly teaches a curriculum heavily weighted with advanced technical subjects.

Each of the main branches of the army, such as the artillery and the armored forces, has a separate system of schools. The air force and the navy also have training set-ups which include academies for the schooling of young officers similar to US academies. Qualifications for acceptance at such schools are determined in part by competitive examinations.

Throughout the armed forces school system, both political and military courses are offered. Political training is in the hands of the political officers at the training establishments and takes up almost half of a student's study time.

In so far as regular in-service training is concerned, it was decreed in 1961 that the total amount of study time for officers was not to be over 500 hours per year for officers above division level, and 300 to 400 hours per year for officers below this level. Sixty percent of this time was to be spent on professional military subjects. The balance was to be spent on political studies and on formal academic training. Specialized technical units were permitted to spend up to 70 percent of their time on professional subjects.

From time to time, the regime has inaugurated "back to the ranks" movements, the military counterpart of the civilian "down-to-the-farm" drives. In these movements officers of all grades are required to serve short tours of from two weeks to a month as enlisted men in order to familiarize themselves with the problems and conditions at basic levels. Although the emphasis on this program varies from time to time, such tours are frequent enough to be considered a standard and time-consuming Chinese Communist technique.

To provide new material for its ground force officer corps, the regime operates a number of basic officer training schools. Non-commissioned officers selected by competitive examination receive up to three years training at these institutions before obtaining their commissions. In lieu of attending basic officer institutes, highly qualified non-coms may sometimes obtain commissions by passing a special examination.

Peiping has begun to look increasingly during the past few years to graduates of civilian college-level institutions as a source for officer material. As early as 1955, a law provided for the establishment of a system similar to the US ROTC program to train reserve officers in the universities. After graduation, persons who had been trained under the system would, if needed, be directly commissioned and placed on active duty. In this manner, and in the operation of the normal graduate placement process, the armed forces draw perhaps 3 to 5 percent of an annual graduating class.

Low academic standards in the Chinese Communist officer corps have been somewhat alleviated recently as a result of tougher regime standards on schooling prior to induction. Today the typical officer up to the rank of captain probably has the equivalent of a high school education. In a bid to raise overall armed force academic standards, Peiping announced a ten-year plan in 1959 to bring all officers up to college level. Like other gradiose schemes introduced in the leap forward period, little has been heard of the program subsequently. It may have been discarded in the general training cutbacks announced in 1960 by Defense Minister Lin Piao.

Enlisted men are schooled as non-coms through a pattern of special battalions scattered through selected divisions. Promising enlisted men are sent to these battalions for courses lasting several months. They return qualified as squad leaders or for higher non-commissioned ranks. Candidates must have demonstrated their political acceptability as well as military aptitude before enrollment.

Since 1960 the Chinese Communists have started to shy away from their near exclusive dependence on Soviet military training manuals, a development doubtless spurred by the widening political breach between Peiping and Moscow. The regime clearly continues to recognize the value of foreign military techniques, however. For example, some US doctrine has been disguised as Chinese and written into Communist training manuals.

V. MANPOWER AND EDUCATION

One-quarter of the world's population lives in Communist China. The rate of growth of this immense population showed a tendency to rise during the early period of Chinese Communist rule, reaching a peak of 2.5 percent per year in 1958. It probably fell thereafter to 1.5 to 2.0 percent as food shortages contributed to a rise in the death rate.

Estimated Population of Communist China By Age and Sex

(in millions at mid-year)						
1953				1962		
Age	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes	Male	Female
Total	583	297	286	706	359	347
0-14	231	117	114	296	150	146
15-59	321	165	156	372	191	181
60+	31	15	16	38	18	20

The Chinese Communist made hesitant and ineffective efforts in 1956-1957 to encourage birth control. Thereafter the effort slowed, and at present publicity on "family planning" is moderate and limited in scope. It is directed almost solely towards the urban population. The rural population makes up over 80 percent of the total in China, and rural births must be severely curtailed if a Chinese birth control campaign is ever to be effective. Even if the regime were energetically to prosecute a program for limiting births, a minimum period of at least five years would probably be required before the program would begin to reduce the national birth rate.

The Labor Force

The total labor force in Communist China grew from some 274 million persons in 1953 to about 316 million persons in 1962. Civilian employment

**EMPLOYMENT OF
MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
(ESTIMATED FOR 1957)**

MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL

In state organs and their subdivisions	1,600,000	
In the communist, non-communist political parties, trade unions, women's and youth organizations	1,200,000	
In economic enterprises	3,500,000	
In education and health	750,000	
SUB-TOTAL		7,050,000

PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL

Engineers	50,000	
Technicians	450,000	
Agro-technicians	80,000	
Teachers at all levels	1,900,000	
Doctors, interns, nurses (excluding midwives and practitioners of Chinese medicine)	340,000	
Cultural and artistic personnel	125,000	
Journalists and lawyers	30,000	
Veterinarians (trained in modern medicine)	10,000	
Meteorologists	15,000	
Scientists and researchers	15,000	
SUB-TOTAL		3,015,000
TOTAL		10,065,000

increased from an estimated 271 million persons to about 313 persons.

More than 85 percent of the civilian force was employed in agriculture. Nonagricultural employment at the end of 1962 is estimated to have been roughly 4 million persons higher than at the end of 1953.

This does not, however, reflect the significant changes which occurred in nonagricultural employment under the communists. Prior to 1957 the creation of new job opportunities in the nonagricultural sectors of the economy lagged behind the growth of the population. In 1958, the "leap forward" brought an enormous expansion in nonagricultural employment. The figure went up by more than 15 million persons during a single year, bringing the total to 55 million. In the ensuing economic debacle, nonagricultural employment declined by 1962 to roughly 43 million persons.

Although Communist China has an abundant supply of unskilled labor, it has always been faced with very serious shortages of technical and skilled labor, shortages that were partially eased by Soviet technicians until they were abruptly withdrawn in mid-1960. The Chinese Communists have attempted to expand the number and quality of technicians and skilled workers at all levels. The increase in the number of trained people and the accumulation of on-the-job experience during the past decade alleviated some, but certainly not all, of these shortages.

The Educational System

Great stress has been laid on various types of education by the Chinese Communists. Schools were built in all parts of the country. Large educational complexes made up of a number of technical colleges were established. Such universities as Peiping, Tsinghua and Chiao Tung, well-known before the Communist takeover, were expanded. In the leap forward period of 1958-1960 the number of institutions for which college status was claimed rose so sharply that educational standards suffered badly. The term college was bastardized to the point where several years later it remains difficult to establish how

many institutions of higher learning are operating in China. Institutions maintaining standards in any way comparable to higher educational levels elsewhere may not be much above the figure of 236 existing at the beginning of the leap forward.

Included were the following types:

Comprehensive	17	17
Polytechnical	10	10
Specialized		
Engineering	40	
Agric. & Forestry	31	
Medical (public health)	37	108
Economics	5	
Law & Politics	5	
Language	8	
Fine Arts	17	
Physical Education	6	41
Teachers	57	57
Others (field not known)	3	3
		236

Total enrollment in institutions of higher education rose from 155,000 in 1947-1948 to around 900,000 in 1960-1961. Enrollment fell thereafter and by the fall of 1962 probably was less than 800,000.

There are four general types of universities and colleges operating in China--comprehensive, polytechnical, specialized technical, and teachers colleges. Comprehensive universities in China are comparable to a faculty of arts and sciences at an American university. They train scientists and college teachers in

basic disciplines such as physics, astronomy, biology, the humanities, etc. Peiping, Fudan, and Nankai Universities fall into this category. Polytechnical universities are made up of several departments, the number of fields covered varying in different schools. Basic engineering principles are emphasized. Examples are Tsinghua, Chiao Tung, and Harbin Industrial Universities. The specialized colleges train personnel for specific assignments in the iron and steel or the aeronautical industry, in surveying, in trade and finance, etc. The teachers colleges are intended primarily to provide teachers for middle schools. Teachers for higher educational institutions are trained by the universities and colleges themselves.

The number of graduates from these institutions from 1949 through 1962 is estimated to be 950,000 distributed as follows:

Engineering	290,000 - 31%
Science	56,000 - 6%
Agriculture	70,000 - 7%
Medicine and Public Health	95,000 - 10%
Teacher Training	276,000 - 29%
Others	163,000 - 17%

A high quality education was received by a small proportion of these graduates. Most did not obtain an education equivalent to that commonly received from accredited colleges in the United States. A shortage of competent teachers was the major limitation. Also contributing was the regime's idea that students should participate in labor and receive a liberal amount of political education. In addition, almost all were allowed to graduate irrespective of academic achievement, many after only two or three years of course work.

The choice of quantity over quality was consciously made. It was probably useful in serving China's short-term needs. Narrow training in specialized fields did turn out graduates fit to meet

immediate needs in industrial, mining, construction, and other activities. The particular specialties of these narrowly trained men were not, however, always responsive to the demands of the moment.

An attempt to meet the need for higher quality in education, recognized as necessary for the long pull, was made in the better universities and polytechnical institutes. Curricula, length of courses, and availability of competent professors suggest that some graduates of these schools were relatively well-trained. Even in these schools there was some sacrifice of quality. Most students were required to take part in physical work and time-consuming political indoctrination meetings. Teachers were overloaded. Effectiveness of the better professors was further reduced by burdensome responsibilities for planning and organizing, turning their talents to practical problems in industry and other activities, parrying disruptive directions of party authorities, and trying to carry out their work in a general atmosphere of frantic urgency to meet ill-defined and changing goals.

Graduate Work

Chinese universities have failed to produce the needed numbers of qualified people prepared to go forward into graduate work. The Academy of Sciences in 1955 and 1956 tried to recruit candidates for a four-year program of graduate training. The selection was to have commenced in August 1955 but only 65 qualified students had been selected by March 1956. In the fall of 1956 the academy found only 268 out of 1,470 applicants qualified for its program. Part of the problem was that many universities were retaining students for their own graduate programs started at about the same time. The situation was so bad that in 1958 the academy set up its own University of Science and Technology to prepare students for later work at the graduate level.

The graduate programs that got under way six years ago have not flourished. Apparently no new graduate students were taken into the program after 1956 until the fall of 1962 when the academy enrolled 213 and the universities about 1,600. None was reported to have completed his work until the fall of 1962, six years after the program started. The academy reported in February 1963 that 99 had completed their

work and that over 400 were in training. Current graduate enrollment in the universities may be in the order of 2,000. The number is not adequate for China's needs.

Limitations on enrollments in the graduate program appear to rest in large part on the shortage of scholars capable of and available for service as tutors. In 1956 only some 200 persons in the academy were named tutors; only about 130 were named in the universities.

Use of Soviet Schools

Education of Chinese students in Soviet bloc countries has contributed to the supply of new scientific and technical personnel in China. Chinese have been trained both in Soviet universities and colleges and in research institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and other academies. Practically all Chinese students sent to the Soviet Union after 1956 were graduate students. Previously large numbers of undergraduates had been sent with numbers reaching nearly 2,000 per year in 1955 and 1956. After 1960 few new students of any level were sent, but a majority of those already enrolled continued their studies. The total number sent in all years is about 7,500 of which about 2,500 were probably graduate students. About 1,100 have completed work for the Soviet kandidat degree. Less than 1,000, probably considerably less, are currently in training at advanced levels in the Soviet Union.

Chinese students in the Soviet Union pursued their studies in many fields of basic and applied science and engineering, judging by the titles of dissertations they have published in Soviet journals. Emphasis was clearly on bread-and-butter subjects applicable to China's immediate needs. Subjects supporting agriculture and public health were the most numerous. Other fields were water conservancy, transportation, electric power, mineral exploitation, chemical and metallurgical industries, and machine building processes. The dissertations revealed no effort to concentrate on complex new technology associated with such fields as nuclear power, computers, modern aircraft, or missiles.

Chinese have taken part, however, in the activities at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna, outside Moscow. This institution trains personnel from all Soviet Bloc countries in nuclear physics, but not in nuclear weapons technology. The work at Dubna is apparently not in the nature of formal study leading to dissertation and degree.

Chinese students returning from graduate study in the Soviet Union probably make up a large majority of the better trained new researchers in China. Although reasonably well trained in a formal sense, they are inexperienced. The best probably are assigned to research institutes of the Academy of Sciences and other academies or to the universities.

Scientific Manpower

The leaders of Communist China appreciate the importance of the contribution made by science and technology to national security. They want effectively planned and directed research in well-equipped and staffed laboratories. Chinese capabilities in this direction have been greatly strengthened over the past decade. Progress, however, has been less than might have been expected from their resources and furious activity. Several factors helped stunt the full flowering of Chinese science.

First of all, many well-trained scientists in China were educated in the western non-communist world. The regime regards their political reliability as doubtful. The leaders cannot risk placing such men in policy-making roles. They are even hesitant about placing such men in positions of lower level authority without the constant and overriding presence of a politically proven party stalwart.

Secondly, the Chinese Communists' passion for quick success led them to use special methods which frequently were not as productive as more traditional means. Research work projects were started, then stopped, under misconceived plans. Available research technicians were misused. Large numbers of poorly trained researchers were thrown into projects as though quantity would substitute for quality. The initiatives of experienced researchers were frustrated all too often by party cadres attempting to manage researchers as though they were machines with on-and-off buttons.

Thirdly, planning for the training of technical personnel has failed in many cases to balance supply and need. The attempt to fix the numbers needed in a narrow technical speciality three to five years ahead has seemed beyond Chinese capabilities. By the time students complete their three- to five-year programs of higher education, needs in many cases have changed. For example, the regime trained so many Russian interpreters and translators that they were in excess long before relations with the Soviets began to cool.

The major staffing problem in China's scientific organizations is, of course, to find enough competent scientists and teachers. At the present time, they have in general a few qualified men backed by a large body of poorly trained and inexperienced personnel. They lack the large group of medium quality, experienced researchers of the kind that make up the main body of the scientific community in a technologically advanced society.

China has a few well-trained and competent scientists in nearly every area of technology. Therefore, useful progress can be made in almost any scientific or engineering project of sufficiently high priority. However, there are not enough first-rate people around to make progress in more than a limited number of advanced projects at any one time. The rate of progress on a priority project can be stepped up only by a process of bleeding other projects.

The training of scientists and technologists appears lately to have been put on a more promising track, but the principal resource for advancement, the well-trained and experienced tutor, remains in short supply. There is no crash program that can solve the problem.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS OF IDEAS

The dissemination of news and opinion in Communist China is managed virtually in its entirety. The voice of dissent is infrequently raised. The leaders in Peiping see their problem in this area largely one of mobilizing the party, the government and the population behind their programs. Principal communications media are used almost exclusively to instruct and goad.

The party rank and file and the people are told only what the leaders feel is necessary for the purpose of carrying out instructions. Rarely does a hint creep out of policy disagreement disagreements within the privileged circle. The party does not regard the spread of dissenting views expressed within this circle as at all helpful, and they are rigorously suppressed.

Classified Channels

The principal means used by the leaders to propagate the party line are classified communications, the open press and radio, and study meetings. Classified publications and documents flow out of the party center by secure telecommunications, by post, and by hand or word of mouth. Leading party figures travel a good deal bringing the latest word from Peiping. Lesser leaders from the outlying areas are brought to Peiping for the same purpose.

The Chinese Communists are intensely suspicious and their security practices are stringent. In fact, they incline to overload the system and hold tightly a range of information openly available in other countries.

Many party and government organs produce restricted publications. These go to a selected clientele, usually officials who have reached a designated level of responsibility or who occupy posts affected by a new turn in the line. The contents are used by such officials as a guide to their day-to-day activities and as background for lectures to subordinates. One such publication is Reference News, a daily bulletin which does little more than rehash foreign news dispatches. The fact that such

a publication is distributed only to officials whose duties are judged to require it testifies to the Chinese Communists' security mania. Open technical publications from abroad are handled in a similar fashion.

The Party Press

Despite this preoccupation with security, a reliable key to Peiping thinking can be found in the pages of party publications like People's Daily and Red Flag. They are carefully studied, for a reader is aware that he may be called upon for a personal elucidation of passages at the next meeting of his study group. The Chinese party press, with its captive audience, is surely among the dullest reading matter offered on a daily basis anywhere in the world.

Articles in the top Peiping publications regarded as especially important get broad and timely dissemination. They are broadcast to both domestic and foreign listeners. Materials so handled are speeches by important regime figures, communiques from Central Committee sessions, vital editorials and a host of lesser items. This material frequently appears verbatim in papers outside the capital the same or the following day. Collections of pertinent articles on a common theme are sometimes gathered into a pamphlet and distributed at home and wherever possible abroad.

Meetings

The meeting is a third channel which supplements and fills out the other two. Meetings and conferences seem to be a necessary part of life in all societies, but in few places do they absorb so much of the person's time and energies as in Communist China. The Chinese Communists have raised the meeting almost to a governing technique. From national conferences held in Peiping with great magnificence to the neighborhood study meeting in a humble dwelling down the block, group discussions are a prominent feature of the Chinese intellectual landscape.

Meetings can be strictly party affairs, or they can involve a mix of party and non-party types in which the party element is always dominant. The objective is to communicate decisions reached

by constituted authority, to explain these decisions, to persuade those in attendance as to the wisdom of the course chosen and to point out to them their part in carrying out the decision.

Even plenary sessions of the party's Central Committee can be viewed in this light. They provide the opportunity for an airing of policy lines which have been hammered out in earlier, more restricted sessions. Regional and local party conferences follow to "pass along the spirit" of the Central Committee's deliberations.

The same is true of sessions of the National People's Congress, the China People's Political Consultative Conference, and the Supreme State Conference. Led by top party men, they are essentially meetings of citizens, whose counsels may at times be genuinely valued but who are normally brought together to hear party leaders expound party policy. An effort is made at such meetings to try and impart to the non-party delegates a sense of participation in the process of ruling China.

There are also specialized conferences like a statistical work conference or a conference on political work in the armed forces. These bring together a group of important officials involved in a common undertaking. Some may precede a party decision on a given subject and may thus represent an opportunity for the expression of individual opinion. But most publicized meetings are convened for the leadership to display its interest in a given topic and expose its views thereon.

Some conferences are used, at least partially, as incentives. For example, the party sponsors periodic conferences of labor heroes, activists and other "advanced elements." Individuals are brought to Peiping at public expense. Some are accorded the honor of meeting key figures, including at times Mao Tse-tung himself. An invitation to such a conference doubtless confers considerable status locally on the recipient.

By far the most prevalent meetings are the regular sessions of one's local study group. Stimulated and directed by party cadres, these small groups of 10-30 persons meet regularly throughout

China. The leaders plainly attach much importance to them since they are willing to accept the significant losses in productive time which they entail. These meetings may take up no more than a few hours a week or they may occupy half a day or more every day over an extended period.

Attendance at the meetings, like many other activities in Communist China, is ostensibly voluntary. Social and other pressures are, however, exerted against absenteeism. Anyone so bold as to cut the meetings could expect visits from local party cadres, friends and colleagues which would be continued until he relented. In the view of one ex-resident of the mainland, attendance is "like going to church in an orphanage."

The topics of these meetings are usually current affairs as seen through the eyes of the party leaders. The Sino-Soviet dispute and Khrushchev's many shortcomings were popular subjects during 1962. The leader, normally a party member, opens a meeting by outlining the party's thought on the selected topic. Everyone joins in the subsequent discussion. Failure to speak out is regarded as suspicious. Persistent refusal to play the game would probably result in a request for a written explanation. This paper would then form the subject matter of a subsequent meeting. Members of the group would subject the explanation to a searching critique for completeness and sincerity, both highly valued in a self-criticism of this sort.

Meetings are sometimes used to persuade an individual or a group of individuals to accept some new task. At the height of the down-to-the-farm movement in 1959-1962, meetings to persuade those earmarked for movement were common. Not many city dwellers were anxious to go out and live and work with the peasants, but there were few recorded instances of refusal after a few persuasion sessions. The earnestness of the group's persuaders was doubtless stimulated by a realization that a lack of all-out effort on their part would only single them as likely candidates for the next batch.

The Chinese Communists have no fixed way of dealing with offenders. One method is to expose an individual to public humiliation and ridicule at a "struggle" meeting. Struggle meetings were

more common during the land reform movement in the early 1950's than they are now. They are still used, however, to deal with persons charged, for example, with counter-revolutionary activities. The meetings are not meant to be public trials. Individuals brought before them have already been judged guilty. The objective is to provide a salutary example for the people.

Such a meeting might be opened by a recitation by the presiding cadre of the political crimes committed, the heresies written, spoken or thought. Comments are invited from the audience, an invitation scarcely to be ignored since silence contains the suggestion of similar infection. The meeting may accept a sniveling confession from the person being "struggled" with or move directly to sentencing, usually either execution on the spot or an open-ended sentence at labor reform. Those who have attended become active agents of regime retribution.

Just how effective are these various methods of spreading the word? The system appears to operate very well when it comes to disseminating regime policy downward. It is in fact one of the most effective things the Chinese Communists do. The system operates less well in other direction. It has been used too frequently by the leadership to smell out real or potential dissent. As a result it has become a sluggish instrumentality for conveying suggestions to the leaders or for informing them of real conditions in the country.

This difficulty in upward communications bothers the leaders at the party center. They have launched periodic campaigns to stimulate discussion and even criticism, and to insist on veracity in reports made to them. They are doubtless sincere, but such efforts encounter formidable obstacles. For one thing an individual can never be quite sure where the boundaries of permissible debate are at a given time. The boundaries shift, and what seems permissible today may turn out to be the rankest sort of deviation tomorrow. Chinese have before them the lesson of aftermath of the liberalization effort of early 1957 when the party promised free debate--to "let one hundred flowers bloom, let all schools of thought contend." Many of the flowers turned into poisonous weeds in a short period of time, and a number of careers were blighted. Recollection of this makes for caution in accepting present Party encouragement to speak out.

Nevertheless, genuine intellectual debate does take place. In 1962, for example, economic publications printed articles which advanced suggestions on how resources could be used more effectively. Others discussed in fairly frank terms the problems of economic management in a socialist state. One even offered the argument that profits had a role to play in a socialist economy. The airing of such ideas was clearly not an attempt by the leaders, who would probably regard the last argument as perilously close to heresy, to propagate a new party line. It seems rather to have been part of an attempt to extend somewhat the boundaries of permissible intellectual discussion.

VII. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SYSTEM

The guiding principles of Chinese Communist personnel management were formulated in the less complicated world of the Chinese revolution and do not appear to have been markedly changed since. They include: 1) the absolute supremacy of the party, 2) a highly centralized management technique, and 3) a remarkable continuity and unity of purpose at the top echelons. They have produced a disciplined and dedicated elite, but at some cost in flexibility and individual initiative.

Mao Tse-tung and his closest associates are strong personalities, the result of rigorous Chinese Communist selection processes. The leading group has displayed high organizational administrative capabilities. It has been able to move with dispatch on some issues confronting China. Its approach to others has been halting. It moved very quickly to exploit to Chinese advantage Soviet discomfiture as a result of the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962. Communes were set up almost overnight in 1958, but the three-year retreat from these ill-conceived units has, on the other hand, been slow and painful.

Party personnel processes have brought to the second level of authority devoted, loyal men who share the aims and convictions of the top leaders and speak the same language. They are men who have had many years of administrative experience, men who have proven themselves to be tough and ruthless. Only true believers get this far in the system. As a group they are more likely to be versed in Marxism-Leninism and the teaching of Mao than in a technical specialty.

Many middle and lower level officials appear able, but there does seem to be a shortage of good administrators and managers. These lesser officials operate in a system which constantly preaches discipline. Naturally, many fail to develop an aptitude for vigorous, independent action. They become adept buck-passers, bureaucrats who check too many things with Peiping. This further overloads the top command in which key figures already hold several concurrent jobs. These officials can give less than full time and energy to any one of their posts. These men, whether in high party position or low,

are in a sense the end product of Chinese Communist political indoctrination. This striking program has to a great extent created and maintained a unity of approach unthinkable in a democratic state. No real opposition is countenanced and no alternative courses are offered. There is relatively little wheel-spinning over objective or method.

The framework for recruitment, transfer and promotion focusses a great deal of power and responsibility in a few hands. The dominant leaders identify national security priorities and commit talent to favored programs in complete freedom. People selected for jobs have no real individual safeguards such as exist in this or western nations. Most Chinese accept this sort of treatment, go where they are told to go by the authorities and do what they are told to do. There is no outside competition for talent. Recruitment and assignment of personnel present no problems; undesirable turnover is rare.

The system permits the authorities to channel the country's best talent, insofar as it is available, into key areas of national security. Great efforts are made to stimulate work in approved scientific, technological and economic fields, especially those related to the martial arts. This work is supported and directed by the party.

However, the system does try, all too frequently, to force round pegs into square holes. The overall record of the assigning authorities might be termed fair to good.

Persons who have visited Communist China testify that the average Chinese Communist functionary is a hard worker. This is partly the result of the existing personnel system. Competition is fierce, and the individual must make his way within the mold in which the system has cast him. There is no opportunity to shift jobs, or even to resign. Advancement depends entirely upon pleasing the authorities above. The asceticism preached by the party helps produce individuals willing to devote themselves fully to their work. The sense of dedication today may not be what it was in the earlier years, but enough remains so that it is a significant strength of the Chinese Communist system.

Material incentives are present and important in keeping the Chinese functionary bent to his task. His perquisites are small, but valued amidst the general poverty of China. These functionaries also work under the stimulus of a system of retribution which operates on abstract and shifting principles.

Overstaffing is a problem in today's China. Swollen staffs can be attributed in part to the Chinese Communist practice of giving on-the-job training to people who will be moved to staff other offices or factories when they are finished. A lack of mechanical aids means that many office and factory tasks, done elsewhere by machine, are done by hand in China. But the most telling reason is simply China's tremendous population.

Skilled manpower in China is strictly limited, yet the present leaders fail to make full use of what they have. They seem quite willing to fritter away some of the talent they do dispose.

Students who have been educated abroad are regarded, almost without exception, with suspicion when they return to China. They are viewed as having been infected by foreign ideas. It is up to them to prove otherwise, and over the long haul. Many returned students, even those afire with the desire to help build up a new China, find it hard to break through this shell of suspicion. They find that the party will not make full use of their hard-won skills.

The leaders in fact find it hard to rely fully on technically trained people, no matter where their education was won. There are in China competent scientists and economists who could contribute more than they do to the development of plans and practices. These people are, under the operation of the present personnel system, rigidly excluded from policy-making roles. The dominant figures--dogmatic, poorly educated and distrustful men--prefer to rely for advice on long-term associates who share the leaders' background, prejudices and shortcomings.

Talent is also wasted in the party's obsessive drive for political conformity. Countless man-hours are devoted to political indoctrination and loss to production or the search for technical know how. The authorities are willing to pay the price.

The personnel situation in Communist China today is in some ways like that in the Soviet Union during Stalin's dying days. The top strata, overworked, old and tired, forms an impenetrable road-bloc for those below. The bureaucracy is stagnating. Advancement, even of able and trusted people, is generally slow and ponderous. Party seniority and personal relationships are still major factors in selection for responsible positions. What remains to be seen is whether the departure of the present leaders will rejuvenate the system.

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9 May 1963
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STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

ANNEXES

CIA Contribution For Subcommittee on
National Security Staffing and Operations
to the Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION
AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEAN-
ING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE
18, USC, SECTION 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH
IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED
PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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ANNEX I

STAFFING A CHINESE COMMUNIST MISSION ABROAD

The model staffing pattern of a Chinese Communist embassy offered in the following paragraphs is an amalgam of excellent covert reports on several Chinese Communist missions abroad. Not all Chinese installations abroad will do all of the things discussed or do them in the same way, but the general pattern probably holds.

General Principles

The Chinese Communist Party controls all overseas installations whatever their function. The unit through which this control is achieved is the installation's party committee. Formation in the mid-1950's of such committees was in fact described as a "big step forward for the party in its leadership of diplomatic work." At our model installation, the committee is headed by the ambassador and includes the second ranking embassy official, the military attache and commercial attache. It meets at least every other day and makes all decisions with respect to the operation of the mission, from whether the ambassador will accept a luncheon invitation to the tone of his conversational remarks if he goes.

It oversees the indoctrination, training, and discipline of all personnel. It organizes the same kinds of campaigns among mission personnel that the party is emphasizing at home. It runs the basic foreign ministry study programs designed to train personnel in embassy duties. These study programs are needed because many officers are sent abroad with little formal training in diplomacy.

The committee also organizes the basic party groups at the mission and oversees the semi-weekly indoctrination meetings which are compulsory for all embassy personnel. Minutes are kept of these meetings and are sent back to the Organization Department in Peiping. Directives on party matters generally come to the mission's party committee from the Organization Department.

The party committee serves as the basic field coordinating unit for foreign operations run by a variety of Chinese Communist agencies. Each of the functional sections at the mission reports back to its counterpart in

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Peiping. Regular mission personnel report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military attache to the Defense Ministry, the commercial attache to the Foreign Trade Ministry, and the intelligence representative to the Party's Investigation Department. These people get their assignment, direction, salary and operating expense from their parent organizations. They all, however, are subordinate to the party committee of the mission.

In case of conflict which cannot be resolved satisfactorily by the local party committee, the parties to the dispute report the problem to their respective home offices in Peiping. If the matter can't be resolved at this level it is referred to one of the Central Committee departments or the Central Committee itself.

Personnel from the Investigation Department operate with a greater measure of autonomy than the others. The practice seems to be keep the Ambassador and the party committee informed on some intelligence operations, but not by any means on all. These people can send reports to Peiping without getting the Ambassador's O.K.

In the interest of using assigned personnel effectively, the ambassador has the authority to organize the mission as he sees fit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is frequently consulted and does make suggestions. Traveling inspectors from the Ministry call periodically to check on mission organization and operations. Across the board economy measures are sometimes ordered by the Ministry. The chief of mission has some latitude in deciding how the cuts will be absorbed.

Mission Personnel

Our model mission, which is in a non-communist country, has some 30 employees. This is 20 fewer than it had before the last big austerity cut in early 1962. Although some Chinese Communist installations abroad employ local help, all 30 were sent out from China. They can generally be classified into three groups; regular diplomats, professional specialists and service personnel. Practically all are party members.

The Chinese Communist diplomatic service has a nucleus of career officers who are shifted from post to post abroad with an occasional tour in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peiping. The ambassador, the first secretary and several of the younger officers are such men. The bulk of the Embassy staff, however, had no background of any kind in

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foreign affairs when they arrived. Few had even travelled abroad. They were selected from the government at large. Some had been surprised at their selection. Not all were delighted.

Only half a dozen of the mission's staff members can speak or read the language of the host country. And only two of these are truly fluent. They are valued and have been longer at the post than anyone else. It is expected that this situation will gradually improve since the foreign ministry is running intensive language courses back in Peiping, and the students there have been assured by Foreign Minister Chen Yi that it is not a deviation to become expert in a foreign tongue. Chen is said to have been disappointed in the quality of linguists produced and to have demanded that more and better ones be trained. Language study is usually available at the overseas installation.

The ambassador, a man in his late fifties, has been a Chinese Communist Party member since he was a student. Prior to his present assignment, he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peiping. His only actual foreign experience was an earlier assignment as a staff member at an embassy in a Soviet bloc country.

The ambassador does not fill the popular image of a suave diplomat. He is regarded by his subordinates as capable and efficient in his work, cold and methodical in his personnel relations. He is married, and has several children.

His wife, but not his children, accompanied him to his present post. She works at the embassy. He is fond of Chinese cooking and eats the food prepared by the embassy cook. He smokes a great deal, but drinks only moderately. Extremely hard working, he spends most of his day at the office.

The number two man is the counselor, who is about 50 years old. He is a normal school graduate and has been a party member since World War II. He has held a series of party positions, but, prior to being assigned to his present post, he had no previous experience either at the foreign ministry or at other missions.

As in the case of the ambassador, the counselor's wife, but not his children, has accompanied him. His wife also works in the embassy. The counselor, a bluff, outgoing man, is relatively free with his opinions. He is well liked and considered competent by his subordinates.

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The third ranking man at the mission is the first secretary. A man in his late forties, he has a college education and is the most fluent linguist at the embassy. A party member, he has been with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the early 1950's, and has been at his present post for six years. He has considerable administrative responsibilities within the embassy. He also oversees the Embassy's Country Section which works on monitoring local publications and takes a leading role in local embassy reporting. He is not married.

The military attache, a lieutenant colonel, is about 45. He is a long-time member of the Chinese Communist party. His entire adult career has been spent in the military service. He has only a secondary school education. Prior to his present assignment he had a tour of duty at another mission as an assistant military attache.

In his present position, he represents all branches of the Chinese Communist armed forces. He is a bluff, straightforward man, completely loyal to the party. He is married, but his wife is in China.

The embassy commercial attache is a man in his late forties. A long time member of the Chinese party; he has only a grade school education. Both his commercial and foreign service experience is scant. He was once employed by a department store in a major Chinese city. He was a member of a trade delegation to a Soviet bloc country in the mid 1950's. This was his only connection with his present work, except for a brief tour to various parts of China designed to familiarize him with Chinese export products. His wife originally accompanied him to his present post but was forced to return in an earlier economy drive.

The cultural attache, a man of 50 years, is also a long time party worker. After graduating from a technical school, he turned his hand to journalism and worked for the New China News Agency for several years. This is his first overseas assignment. His wife is with him and works as his assistant at the embassy.

The nominal head of the General Affairs Section, who is about 35 years old, is actually the chief of the embassy's Investigation Department unit. As such he is the only officer at the embassy besides the ambassador permitted to leave the embassy compound along. His wife is with him and works as one of his assistants. Both are very experienced in intelligence work, and both are long time party members.

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One of the employees of the Country Section was recently sent back to China. He was a man of around 35, who had come from a good family and had served in various foreign posts since the early 1950's. He did not, however, get along with the ambassador, who, he felt, discriminated against him. He was subjected to several long rounds of "criticism and self-criticism" at the embassy, and, when he failed to display a proper attitude, and was sent back to China for an indeterminate period of corrective physical labor.

The Operation of the Mission

The business of the mission is to serve as the eyes and ears of Communist China in the country concerned and to do what it can locally to implement Chinese Communist foreign policy. The ambassador once told the staff that he considered the main tasks of the mission were: to influence local public opinion in favor of the Chinese Communists; to turn the country from its pro-western stance; and to help overthrow the government. There was not a great deal of optimism at the installation that these aims were at all feasible. It was recognized that the embassy was hampered by lack of money and qualified people, and by the party's insistence on regarding the mission as a beleaguered castle in the heart of enemy country.

The main effort is of course to collect information on the country in which the embassy is located. This is accomplished in three principal ways: by close attention to the local press and radio, by open contacts with the local populace, and by covert operations. The mission's linguists regularly read the leading local newspapers and magazines. Articles judged to be of interest to Peiping are translated. Those which comment on China are commonly included, though there is a tendency to soften some of the more critical material.

Items which contradict an official Chinese Communist interpretation of a situation are often altered or ignored. The translations are airmailed to other posts in the area and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This service forms the bulk of the embassy's day-to-day reporting.

Reporting from the post does not draw heavily on informed local opinion. This is probably due to the fact that the embassy does not expend great efforts to establish and maintain close contacts either in local official or non official circles. Some staff members, including

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the ambassador, tend to regard contacts with non-communists as generally worthless and potentially dangerous.

They may have in mind the fate of an earlier officer who was forced to undergo a lengthy session of self-criticism both at the embassy and back in Peiping for having had too wide and free contacts with the local population. In addition, the military attache probably recalls his entirely unsuccessful attempts to visit local military establishments.

Even contacts with the local communist party are none too free. In the first place the leadership of the local party has shown a tendency to lean toward the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The ambassador and the counselor have on several occasions expressed their disgust with them, suggesting that their consuming interest in personal comfort was no way to get a revolution going. There are, however, several local communists who are viewed with favor, probably for their more militant stands. These are cultivated by the top people at the embassy who have them in for talks and accept invitations to visit their homes or offices. Other than this, the embassy's contacts with the local party are limited to attempts to place articles favorable to the Chinese Communist position in local communist outlets. The principal objective in dealing with the local party is to influence rather than to learn. No attempt is known to be made to tap the local apparatus for information and insights on the local scene. The views which appear in the local communist papers are included in the material airmailed back to Peiping, but the ambassador rejected an idea that wider contacts would be useful on the grounds that he knew more of what was going on in the country than the local party did.

The embassy, along with a number of other Chinese Communist missions abroad, has come under fire recently for failing to understand conditions in the countries to which they are attached. The embassies were criticized for their failure to get and report "inside information" and for their superficial analysis of such information as was collected.

The main reportorial effort goes into the semi-annual policy and progress review. This is written by the ambassador using contributions from each of the embassy's functional components. It covers the objectives pursued by the embassy in the past six months, the progress made toward reaching them, the problems encountered and

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a statement of what remains to be done. Such summaries are apparently called for in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' reporting schedule. They probably are used in compiling the Ministry's own periodic progress reviews.

These periodic studies supplement and summarize regular classified pouch and cable messages in which the embassy sets forth its observations on the local scene. These are neither particularly voluminous nor frequent. Added information is provided by the local representatives of the Investigation Department.

In the first half of the 1950's, the Chinese shifted the intelligence gathering function among different party, government and military agencies. Beginning in 1956 it was gradually brought under more centralized control. The function came to rest in the party's Investigation Department under Tsou Ta-peng. The department is not listed in any unclassified official government or party documents and can be considered a completely clandestine organization. This organization sends its own people abroad under the cover of government agencies which have legitimate overseas connections.

Personnel sent abroad under foreign ministry cover conform to the general standards for diplomatic personnel. Both length of tour and conditions of service are similar to those of the ministry. Wives of intelligence officers are frequently sent abroad. There seems to be a decided preference for husband-wife teams in Chinese intelligence work. Wives not only do secretarial work, but in many cases serve as couriers or agent handlers.

Generally, but not invariably, intelligence personnel are placed in the middle range of foreign service assignments. Whatever the cover position, the individual is accorded treatment inside the embassy in keeping with his party status. Persons whose cover position is of a lower grade than his real position with the Investigation Department are paid the salary of the cover position; the difference is credited to his bank account in Peiping.

The embassy's intelligence people draw heavily on the local Chinese community for agent personnel. Major intelligence targets include political, economic, scientific, industrial and military developments in the country where the embassy is located as well as in nearby nations. Regional groupings, the impact of US economic and military aid and the extent of the US influence are other subjects of interest.

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The embassy is also instructed, from time to time, to try to promote cultural and commercial exchanges. The commercial attache, for example, returned from a recent home leave to push more aggressively the sale of Chinese products in an attempt to earn more foreign exchange. Previously trade had been seen largely as a device to influence local people. On his return he set up an exhibit of Chinese products and visited a number of firms in an effort to stimulate their interest in Chinese products. He was not highly successful but did get a few nibbles.

The cultural attache tries to see that Communist China gets a good press locally. He takes charge of distributing the New China News Agency's daily news bulletins, and responds eagerly to requests for information on Communist China. He supplements the press clipping efforts on the embassy's research staff by sending extracts of local press stories and editorial opinion back to the New China News Agency in Peiping. On occasion he has gone to nearby countries to cover special events for the agency.

Money is a big factor in communications between the embassy and Peiping. Telegraphic traffic, compared to US standards, is miniscule. Three to four telegrams a day are sent in very heavy periods. At other times only one telegram is sent every three or four days. The embassy probably averages around one to two a day. There is a full time code clerk to handle classified traffic, and, although the volume of incoming traffic is not known, he certainly is not overworked. A diplomatic pouch is picked up by a pair of the ministry's forty couriers about once a month. These couriers, incidently, are among the most highly indoctrinated of Chinese Communists. The product of a most painstaking clearance process, they get a three-month, full-time reindoctrination course every year. Yet they almost always travel in pairs. The bulk of the classified exchanges between Peiping and the embassy go by these pouches. The open mail is used for some normal business, such as the transmission of the daily press translations.

As it does within China, the party relies heavily upon personal briefings to keep abreast of what its overseas installations are up to and to keep the installations appraised of the latest policy developments in Peiping. Area conferences for ambassadors are held periodically. At times the ambassadors are called back to Peiping for consultations. At least 21 ambassadors, more than half the total, were brought back to be briefed after the Central

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Committee's tenth plenum in September 1962. When the ambassadors return to their posts, they pass along to key members of their staffs the substance of the information received. Embassies occasionally are visited by touring officials from Peiping, who usually brief the embassy staff.

As a general rule, the members of the mission feel isolated from Peiping and have been at times embarrassed by the lack of specific policy guidance. Many Chinese foreign service personnel, for example, were not able to interpret either the commune program or the Chinese positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute to Peiping's satisfaction. In some cases even the ambassadors were not filled in well enough to discuss important matters with members of their own staffs.

The embassy has found that its quickest and most direct contact with the party line is Radio Peiping. The ambassador has made it compulsory for all personnel to listen to two one-hour programs every day. He feels that this contributes to the embassy's understanding of what is going on in Peiping and provides useful material for the regular study sessions. The ambassador himself gets an airmail copy of the People's Daily, which generally arrives three days after printing. The daily bulletin of the New China News Agency are also received by airmail. All party men at the embassy subscribe to the elite theoretical journal Red Flag, but it reaches them by surface mail about a month after publication.

Difficulties in communication are particularly irritating to embassy officials since they must constantly refer even seemingly trivial matters to Peiping for decision. All requests for visas, for example, have to be checked with Peiping, as do such matters as who is to be asked to the annual observation of National Day.

Life Abroad

Members of the embassy lead a highly insular existence. Not only are they cut off from home by distance and poor communications but the party's approach to the problem of running an embassy in a capitalist country cuts them off from rewarding personal relationships with local inhabitants. Life at the embassy is viewed as a constant struggle against the "corrupting influence of the capitalist world." The ambassador regards the struggle as particularly acute in his embassy since all personnel are daily

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confronted with the palpable difference between what the party has taught them about a capitalist country and the reality around them.

The party's answer is to try to recreate the living and working conditions of Peiping at the embassy. The ministry, for example, has gone to the trouble and expense of sending a Chinese cook to the embassy. Everyone eats Chinese food prepared by him. They eat well by Chinese standards, but not lavishly. Most staff members wear the plain style of trousers and jacket popularized by the Chinese Communist leaders, although the top people sometimes don western-style clothes when leaving the embassy precincts. Only the highest ranking men, or Investigation Department personnel, can leave the embassy alone. All others must leave in pairs. Even so, the ambassador recently instituted a requirement that those leaving had to sign out, stating where they were going, and why, and when they would be back.

Except for the ambassador and his wife, all staff members eat in the embassy mess hall and sleep in embassy quarters. Both are in the same building with the embassy offices. The ambassador and his wife live in a separate house, and while he sometimes joins the staff for a meal he usually eats in his office with his wife or another colleague.

The embassy is open for business from 8:30am to 6:00pm. Recreation is planned in advance and taken in groups. It generally involves short trips to nearby places. At other times reading, listening to the radio, watching television or an infrequent movie sent out from China are the chief forms of relaxation. Such moves were more common prior to the big 1962 austerity movement than they are now. A dinner will sometimes be sponsored by the embassy at a local Chinese restaurant, say, to celebrate Chinese New Year's or the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist government. However, invitations to diplomatic functions even from embassies of the socialist bloc, are closely monitored by the party committee and not infrequently rejected. Some are accepted and then ignored.

The atmosphere inside the embassy building is one of mutual suspicion. Petty admonitions are common. The more progressive elements are constantly on the alert for suggestions of deviationist tendencies. For example a simple act like turning on the embassy television set might open one to charges of being attracted to the bourgeoisie life.

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Such a charge, once made, can easily develop into an extended and uncomfortable period of self-criticism at the embassy's regular study groups.

Homesickness is common. Tours of duty are long and only senior officers have their wives with them. The younger officers serve without their wives, who are left behind in China with the children. For such officers the news of hardships at home for the past few years has been particularly upsetting.

Bachelors fare little better. They are warned against fraternizing with local girls and can under no circumstances marry one. There are no female employees except for the wives of higher-ranking officers. One bachelor at the embassy had been engaged to a girl back in China. She married someone else when he could not get leave to return to China.

There are, however, saving elements in the situation. The officer abroad gets a clothing allowance and free medical service. His food and lodging are provided at nominal charges. Most of them are able to build up their savings, and some officers at the embassy deposit up to 50 percent of their salaries in their accounts in Peiping. Need for local currency is limited, but the officers do like to purchase and send back to relatives items such as clothing which are hard to come by in China. One of the ranking officers has taken advantage of his present assignment to pick up a number of luxury items for himself. He has bought a radio, a television set, a German camera, a Swiss watch, a record player and new clothes for himself and wife.

It is likely that, despite the restrictive aspects of his life abroad, the average employee of the embassy considers himself better off than if he had remained in China. As one of them once remarked, "If I had not joined the party, I would probably still be an insignificant school teacher back in China."

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ANNEX II

THE STAFFING OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY

The Chinese Communist regime must maintain public order over a territory of 3.7 million square miles and a population of almost 730 million people. Although the Chinese regime places great emphasis on persuasive measures to achieve political stability, the coercive aspects of this national security goal are also extensive.

The Ministry of Public Security represents the coercive arm of the government. The Canton Public Security Bureau one of the Ministry's geographical subdivisions, is an important part of the security system. Canton in Kwangtung province is the fifth largest city in the country and is located in part of China which has extensive foreign contacts. Many Overseas Chinese come from Kwangtung. Canton is close to the free world border at Hong Kong. Daily social and business traffic between the two cities is substantial. Canton is a natural headquarters both for external intelligence operations and for operations designed to counter foreign penetration attempts.

Comparatively detailed information on the staffing policies of the Canton Bureau have provided by a man who worked in the Economic Security Department of this Bureau for about four years. Prior to his defection in 1958, he was charged with investigating the political reliability of the employees of government economic agencies such as industrial plants, banks, and commercial units. The personnel of the Economic Security Department were essentially plainclothes investigators. One of their functions was to screen employees of economic agencies. By 1958, the Economic Security Department had investigated and maintained files on more than 80,000 persons, almost four percent of the city's population.

The Canton Public Security Bureau employed about 7,000 persons, of which some 2,000 were professional personnel. The professionals represented a fairly homogeneous group with respect to age, social origins, and political status.

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The employees of the Bureau were all young. With the exception of the head of the Bureau who was in his late forties, almost all full-time professional personnel were under 30.

Most members of the bureau staff were not natives of Kwangtung. They were recruited largely from northern China and thus had few personal ties with the local population. The family background of employees was closely checked. No family connections with either substantial wealth or anti-communist political movements were permissible. The individuals themselves could have had no affiliation with a political movement other than the Chinese Communist Party. No foreign associations were permitted, either travel abroad or relatives residing overseas.

All 2,000 professional employees of the bureau were party members, and many others on the staff were Youth League members. The senior people represented a hard core of experienced personnel. Each of the top five had had more than 20 years of experience in Chinese Communist intelligence work. Together they probably made up the bureau's party committee.

All other professional personnel had been recruited from one of the four following groups: 1) young men in party or Youth League work, recommended by the party officials in charge of these groups as being particularly "progressive" and promising; 2) exceptionally bright high school graduates, recommended by school authorities and selected by the bureau on the basis of competitive examination; 3) former police or intelligence operatives of the Kuomintang, employed as agents for specific projects because of their special knowledge of either technique or locality (use of such individuals was more common in the early 1950's than in 1958); and, 4) wives of bureau employees. In 1958 there were about 500 women employed in the bureau.

With the exception of the third category, most employees had virtually no experience in police work when taken into the bureau. Recruits entering on duty were given a basic training course in public security operations at the bureau's training center, the Canton Institute of Public Security. This was followed by a six-months probationary assignment. Successful completion of this pair of programs resulted in the recruit's full integration into the public security force.

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Thereafter personnel of the bureau were trained empirically on the job. Formal instruction was offered after hours in general investigation and surveillance techniques. Many availed themselves of this opportunity. Few members of the bureau were sent out of Canton for further training. At higher levels of the public security system, study for as long as two years at the National Public Security Institute in Peiping was mandatory. Such a course of study was a prerequisite for promotion to the section chief level in a provincial public security bureau.

The Canton municipal and Kwangtung provincial public security organizations each had their own schools. These specialized in part-time training courses, offering political as well as technical courses.

Day-to-day political indoctrination at the bureau was the responsibility of the party committee. Sessions were both frequent and thorough. Besides attendance at the usual sessions of his political study group the party member had to present himself at meetings conducted quite often by the bureau's party committee which contained a large measure of political instruction.

There were no overall educational standards for employment in the bureau. Self-improvement was encouraged in all walks of life in Communist China and any desire for schooling was encouraged. The staff did not appear to be under any strong pressures, however, to improve its educational level.

Promotion in the bureau was based on a combination of the individual's ideological sturdiness and his professional ability. Below the level of section chief at the bureau, the departmental party committee could recommend promotion to the political department of the bureau. The actual promotion action was taken by the political department. For promotion to section chief, the departmental recommendations was reviewed by the party committees at both the Canton and the Kwangtung Public Security Bureau. It was then submitted to the Canton Party Committee for final action. Department heads at the bureau were appointed by the Canton Party Committee with the approval of the State Council.

Transfers were fairly frequent within the public security system. The former bureau employee worked for four years as an investigator in the Honan Provincial Public Security Bureau before being transferred

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to Canton. His transfer was also a promotion. When he got to Canton, he was assigned administrative responsibilities for the first time and was appointed deputy section chief in an organization doing the same type of investigation work that he had done in Honan. Transfers also occur to jobs which require security training outside the public security agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, gets its security personnel from these agencies. Special training necessary for a new assignment--such as the complicated physical security measures needed to protect an embassy in foreign territory, or the use and detection of electronic devices--is provided by the security agencies prior to transfer.

The grade and classification system used in the Canton bureau in 1958 was still provisional, although other civilian and military ranking systems had been fixed by about 1955. A rank classification committee had been established in Peiping of representatives from the Ministry of Public Security, the Central Committee of the Party, the State Council, and the General Political Department of the armed forces. The committee was set up to study the Soviet public security organization and to formulate standards for classification and the assignment of Chinese public security personnel. As far as the former employee knew, it had never issued its findings.

Public security employees enjoyed a relatively high standard of living and a measure of prestige. The professionals as a group were extremely young. Their education was no better than moderate. Yet they held responsible positions in an organization which exercised a considerable measure of control over the general population.

Living standards for public security personnel at the professional level appeared to approach the levels enjoyed by officers of the armed forces. Only single men were required to live in barracks. In 1958 only about 1,000 out of 7,000 employees did so. The employees were well uniformed and enjoyed both food and drink on a scale not granted to the average Chinese. Salary payments were considered adequate. And it was possible to incur operational and entertainment expenses in the line of duty if they were substantiated by authorized receipts.

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Discipline within the public security force was largely a party responsibility, since almost all employees were members. Punishment depended, of course, on the nature and severity of the offense, but it always included a crawling session of self-criticism before the relevant party committee. If the misdeemeanor was serious enough, self-criticism could be followed by removal from position, demotion in either grade or salary, dismissal, or actual criminal prosecution. Disciplinary action could be taken for reasons that extended well beyond job-related misconduct into an individual's private life. The former employee was once disciplined by the party after his wife, herself a party member, reported that he struck her. More damaging, however, was her second charge that he frequently criticized party meetings in private for being dull and time-consuming.

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ANNEX III

STAFFING AN INDUSTRIAL PLANT

A basic policy of the Chinese Communists is that the key positions in state-owned enterprises must be filled by trusted party officials, regardless of their technical qualifications. This rule has been relaxed slightly, but only slightly, since 1960 when the party decided reluctantly that it would have to begin giving greater respect to technicians. Trained persons are being given more authority over actual production processes, but the chief of a plant is still invariably a long-time party official. Most of his key deputies still come from the party organization rather than up from the ranks of technicians. Exceptions exist mainly in very tiny enterprises or those employing especially complex processes. In such cases the deputy will probably turn out to be a non-party technician. In general, however, non-party persons can aspire to reach only the third echelon, below the manager and his deputies.

The party further insures control by providing the officials that staff the plant's Party Committee. This committee is a sort of board of directors supplying policy guidance and overseeing operations. Full-time officials on the committee rank with senior management. Friction between party and management occasionally occurs, but the party generally is able to keep it in check. It is not uncommon to have the same person serve concurrently as plant manager and as secretary of the Party Committee.

Information on current staffing practices in Chinese Communist enterprises can be obtained from the large number of refugees who are constantly leaving the mainland of China for Hong Kong. Probably a typical staffing pattern is the one that exists in the Peiping Machine Tool Plant Number Two. A man who worked at this plant until 1962 says it is average in size and level of technology. It employed 3,800 workers in 1960, a total that was cut to 2,400 during the nationwide industrial retrenchment of 1961-1962. Its products are metal-cutting machine tools (two models of a grinding machine, a shaper, and a boring machine) which it sells for the equivalent of \$1,800 to \$20,000 each. Its quality standards are high, and it managed to export 50 shapers in 1962.

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The manager of the Machine Tool Plant has three deputies, who run the production, supply and administration, and personnel departments. Like most Chinese enterprises, this plant is organized on three levels of administration: departments, sections, and basic-level units (such as workshops and warehouses).

Senior personnel at the plant were described by the refugee. The chief, 45 years old, had participated in the Long March of the 1930's. He has a ninth-grade education, is married, and has three children. His wife works in the Personnel Section.

The first deputy, 55, runs the Production Department. He has the title of Chief Engineer although he has no technical knowledge and must rely on the Chief of his Technical Section for technical guidance. A good political organizer, he has only a sixth-grade education. The second deputy, 55, is in charge of supply and administration. Also a veteran of the Long March, he has a junior middle school (ninth-grade) level of education. The deputy for personnel, 55 and a veteran of the Long March, boasts that he fought in the civil war through the Hainan Island campaign of January 1950.

The Chief of the Technical Section, 50, is a native of Peiping. He is a college graduate and the most highly qualified technical man in the factory. He actually does the Chief Engineer's work. The Chief of the Plant Maintenance Section, 55, also is a college graduate. The Inspection Section, which has the vital responsibility of controlling the quality of production, is headed by a female, age 27, who is a Party member.

The Chief of the Security Section, 55, is a veteran party member who transferred to this job directly from the armed forces. The Personnel Section is headed by a 55-year-old female who was a lieutenant colonel in the army. In the Chinese Communist system, army officers receive full pay when they transfer to a civilian post; the Personnel Section Chief therefore receives salary of 160 yuan per month, which makes her the highest-paid employee in the plant. In fact, ex-army people are prominent in plants throughout China in the vital personnel and security functions.

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